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1. Introduction. 
  
The studying of post-Soviet States are now not as fashionable as they were a few years 
ago. There are many reasons for that, both political and economic. In practice, the only sector 
of politics, which for many years have been and will continue to be at the center of day-to-day 
international relations in Europe is processes in military contacts and cooperation between 
former Soviet republics. The reason is obvious – multi-million armies, mounts of weapons 
and huge military-industrial complex of the USSR continue to be important factor of 
European politics and natural reaction of Russian neighbors is to protect their security from 
instability in the Eastern part of European continent and Eurasia in general. That is why 
analysis of continuing military cooperation of the CIS countries has both academic and 
practical interest. Another significant topic of the research related to future of NATO. After 
the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty, the future of the Alliance (NATO) is to some extend 
dependent on what new areas of its activities the organization can cope with, securing at the 
same time its historical involvement into issues and challenges of practice of world politics.  
 
In the framework of our research authors had several opportunities to visit (together or 
individually) Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. There were 
tens of interviews, Q&A during conferences and seminars, many meetings with politicians, 
diplomats, military officers where we were trying to learn from our colleagues their views on 
CIS and its military wing. Distinctive feature of all our meetings and interviews was their 
open-minded character and readiness to discuss this complex issue.  
 
What do we understand under “military cooperation”? 
 
We use in our research broad concept of national and international security as it was 
formulated in the new Strategic Concept of NATO, adopted in April 1999, and in the new 
Concept of National Security of Russian Federation, which came into force in early 2000. 
Traditional neo-realist way of understanding interstate relations as search for power and 
stability in anarchic by definition world is not working in CIS studies, at least in studies of 
security challenges of Western part of CIS and the Baltic states. That is why set of ideas 
presented by constructivism and studied in many new publications of both Western and CIS 
scholars is reinforced us during our multiple interviews to question about all types of socio-  3 
political life in the region.
1 Next important concern of our study is related to current status of 
the CIS and perspectives for the organization in future. The disappointment from lack of 
dynamics in the CIS and its bodies was perfectly expressed by experts of the Institute of 
National Security and Strategic Studies: “In the post-Soviet space the processes of 
disintegration are continuing. Just few percents from thousands of negotiated and adopted 
agreements and decisions have been implemented into practice. The cooperation in military 
and military-political sphere is practically blocked”.
2 Why former parts of superpower are not 
able to cooperate and what is the institutional influence on military cooperation in the CIS? 
As a result of our research we would like to give our point of view on the problems and 
foresee new possible scenarios for CIS and the Treaty on Collective Security in mid-term 
future. 
 
When studying interstate relations we had to keep in mind that Russia itself is a 
challenge to European security for its Western partners. As Roman Shporlyuk from the 
Harvard University noted recently: “Today politicians and influential analysts in Moscow pay 
much more attention to problem of how to “take back” Minsk, Alma-Ata and Kiev than how 
“not to lose Kazan”. They think more about restoration of Empire and less about construction 
of their own country”
3 That’s why the next purpose of the study is to analyze allegation as  
hypothesis, which include an opportunity for NATO to contain the threat of “restoration of 
Empire” if it’s the case, of course. 
 
NATO has sought to change itself in a significant manner with the ending of the Cold 
War. Although it remains an alliance based on the twin principles that an attack against one 
member state is an attack against all of them and that the USA and Canada are linked to the 
security of Europe, NATO since 1990 has developed a two new strategic concepts, taken on a 
much broader mission and altered the means by which it seeks to accomplish its aim of 
achieving peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic region. The types of military initiatives flowing 
from these shifts can be distinguished from those of external adaptation, which include 
partnership with Russia and Ukraine, and internal adaptation, which include European 
                                                 
1 The very good example of constructivist agenda in security studies is: Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), The Culture of 
National Security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
2 Kazennov Sergey Yu., Kumachev Vladimir N. Kakoy “soyuz nerushimyi” nuzhen Rossii? Moskva: Institut 
natsionalnoy bezopasnosti i strategicheskih issledovaniy, 1998. 
3 Shporlyuk, Roman. Russkiy vopros i imperskaya ekspansiya. In: Makeev, Sergey (ed.) Demony mira i bogi 
voiny. Sorsialnye konflikty v postkommunisticheskom mire. Kiev: Politychna Dumka, 1997, p. 267.   4 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), Combined Joint Task Force concept and the new 
military command structure.
4 
 
Significant share of issues in the CIS is related to the problem of relations between one 
big power (Russia) and a number of small states (with the only exception of Ukraine, even 
being in economic and political crisis). Annette Baker Fox’s classic study of small states 
demonstrated that a small power can optimize its position and maximize its freedom of 
maneuver by taking advantage of great-power interests. Great powers have wide and varied 
agendas unlike small powers that tend to focus on the primary aim of how to cope with a large 
neighbor. The Small power thus turns its full scope of resources towards minimizing 
vulnerability and maximizing the capacity to maneuver. 
 
The effect of the end of the Cold war on small statehood has been studied by K.J.Holsti. 
He contends that divisive forces plunging states into “wars of the third kind” challenge not 
only the notion of the sovereign state but also the division of states into large and small 
powers based on capabilities and resources. Holsti argues that international political units of 
the post-cold war order are differentiated on the basis of their degree of coherence and 
legitimacy, resulting in “weak and failed” states, on the one hand, and “strong” states, on the 
other.
5 
 
We would like to thank many people for opportunity to meet during our visits, make 
interview or ask questions during conferences and seminars in Liège, St.Petersburg, Kiev, 
Yalta, Brussels, Chicago, Helsinki, Warsaw, Kishinev (Chisinau), Bishkek, Almaty, 
Tashkent, Minsk. People, who contributed to the research by their ideas and personal points of 
view are: 
 
We are very grateful for opportunity to meet and talk to: Alexander Anisimov, The 
Center of Strategic Research (Moscow and St-Petersburg); Mr. Iskandar K. Asadullaev, 
Director of the Centre for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan; Dr. Dzhanghir Atamali, Deputy Coordinating Director, Association of Euro-
                                                 
4 General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the Military Committee, ‘A New NATO for a New Century”, Address 
to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Group, Brussels, 15 October 1997, at 
www.nato.itn/docu/speech/1997/s97101b.htm 
5 Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 82-
98.   5 
Atlantic Cooperation, Moscow; Werner Bauwens, Office of Information and Press, NATO 
Head-Quarters; Colonel Anvar A. Berdiev, Chief of the Foreign Relations Department at the 
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Dr. Marco  Carnovale, Political 
department, NATO Headquarters; Alexander Dergachev, the editor-in-chief, The Political 
Thought (Kiev); Tuomas Forsberg, Director of the Finnish Institute of International Relations, 
Helsinki; Dr. Jeff  Gedmin, Executive Director, "New Atlantic Initiative, USA; Sergey 
Geivandov, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Russian Federation; Vadim Grechaninov, President, Atlantic Council of Ukraine; Ove Hall, 
Ministry of Defense of Sweden; Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Deputy Director, Scottish Centre for 
International Studies; H.M. Ambassador Christopher Ingham, British Embassy to Uzbekistan; 
Dr. Irina Isakova, Research Fellow, Centre for Defense Studies, London; Dr. Alla Karimova, 
Head of Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Serguei 
Kassymkoulov, Counseiller at the Embassy  of the Kyrgyz Republic to Belgium; Mr. 
Vacheslav Khamisov, Scientific Secretary of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
under the President of Kyrgyz Republic; Anvar R. Khidirov, Attaché at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Professor Ozod Khusanov, Deputy Rector of 
the Academy of State and Social Construction under the President of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan; Viktor Kochukov, Counsellor of Embassy of the Russian Federation in Belgium; 
Colonel-General Yevgeny Kondakov (ret.) Ministry of Defense of Russia; Sergei Konoplyov, 
Ukrainian National Security Program, Harvard University; Dr. Tatyana S. Koroleva, 
Scientific Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyz Republic; Colonel 
Valery Manko, General Staff, Russian Ministry of Defense; Ingmar Oldberg, Ass.Director of 
Research, Defense Research Establishment, Sweden; Ms. Irina Orolbaeva, Deputy Director of 
the Strategic Studies and Information Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kyrgyz Republic; Dr. Vyacheslau Paznyak, Director of the International Institute for Policy 
Studies, Minsk, Belarus; Grigoriy Perepelitsa, National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kiev; 
Colonel Sergey Pokladov, General Staff, Russian Ministry of Defense; Mr. Sabir Saidov, 
Head of the Department of Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan; Ivan Safranchuk, Center of Political Studies (PIR-Center), Moscow; Valery 
Shtepa, MP, member of the National security and defense Committee, Supreme Rada of 
Ukraine; Yevgeny Silin, President of the Association of Euro-Atlantic Co-operation, 
Moscow; Dr. Pavel Smirnov, Center for International Studies, institute of the USA and 
Canada, Moscow; Stephan De Spiegeleire, Program of International Studies, RAND; Dr. 
Bulat K.Sultanov, Advisor to Director in International Relations at the Kazakhstan Institute   6 
for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Professor Anita 
Tiraspolski, The French Institute of International Relations, Paris.  
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 2. The Tashkent treaty (1992) 
 
At the time of collapse of the USSR authorities in Moscow had an illusion that 
Russian army was able to guarantee security for the whole post-Soviet space. In other words 
Moscow planned to take a traditional for Russia/ the USSR role of the "elder brother" for the 
post-Soviet republics having put those contacts on the new level. But the first years of 
independence proved that military, political, economic and even diplomatic possibilities of 
Russia to dominate at the post-Soviet space in old forms typical for the USSR were rather 
limited.  
On 15
th May 1992 Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on Collective Security at the capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent. 
Azerbaijan, Belorussia and Georgia joint the Treaty later.
6 In April 1994 the Treaty on 
Collective Security came into force after the process of ratification. 
  
The Tashkent Treaty did not foresee a wide military integration of participating states. 
In accordance to it the mechanism of consultations between participants was to be formed. 
Therefore it was a political but not a military treaty.  
 
The Treaty created a basis for new level of security problems solution for the 
participants with political peaceful means. It was a foundation for co-operation in the process 
of constructing new security system in the post-Soviet area.    For instance, the Treaty says 
that the security system, which is to be formed, will be able to become a part of a future 
common and universal security for Europe and Asia. Hence a multi-polar world, which was 
an ideal of Russian foreign policy of the 90
th, was a strategic target of the states, which signed 
the Tashkent treaty.  
 
                                                 
6 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan decided to be members of the Treaty on Collective Security because of 
very concrete reasons. Uzbekistan in 1992 was going to use the Treaty for improving its influence on destroyed 
by civil war Tajikistan. Tashkent had its own candidates for governmental positions in Dushanbe, but Moscow 
didn’t allow to fulfill the plan. Georgia was hoping that Moscow would stop its support of separatists in 
Abchasia. Azerbaijan had the same expectations towards Russian support of Armenia. But Russia decided to 
follow the line which was chosen in early 1990ies – to use low-intensity conflicts on the territory of former 
USSR for obtaining control over New independent States. 
   8 
In accordance to other document signed in a framework of the Tashkent treaty  (the 
Conception of Collective Security) the participant states are to guarantee a collective security 
by all means and the priority is given to the peaceful settlement.   The main orientations of co-
operation at this sphere were following: 
1) Co-operation with other states and international organisations to form a system of 
collective security in Europe and Asia, 
2)  Development of trust in a military sphere 
3) Establishment and development partnership relations with different military-political 
organisations with regional security structures to strengthen peace and to conduct 
peacekeeping operations in accordance with decisions of the UN Security Council.  
4)  Co-ordination of measures in the sphere of disarmament and struggle against proliferation. 
5)  Co-operation on frontiers and so on.
7 
 
   Article 4 of the Tashkent treaty stipulates that "in case of accomplishment of an act of 
aggression against the any of the country-member, all other member-countries provide it with 
necessary aid, including military assistance and they render disposable funds to that country-
member on the basis of realisation of the right of collective defence in accordance with 
Article 51 of UN Charter". Hence, political activity composes the background for co-
operation in the interests of forming of the system of collective security. Council of collective 
security (CCS), which is the highest intergovernmental political body, realises this political 
activity. Council of collective security comprises presidents, ministers of foreign affairs, 
ministers of defence of member-countries of the Tashkent treaty and the General Secretary of 
the Council of collective security as well. The Council of ministers of foreign affairs of 
member-countries is the highest consultative body of the Council of collective security 
concerning the questions of co-ordination of external policy. The Council of ministers of 
defence of member-countries is the highest consultative body of the Council of collective 
security concerning the questions of military policy and military building. 
 
The Treaty defines two forms of consultations: urgent and regular. Urgent 
consultations are held on the level not lower than deputy minister of foreign affairs and 
deputy minister of defence of member-country. Regular consultations are held in the form of 
                                                 
7 Zemskiy Vladimir V. Kollektivnaya bezopasnost na prostranstve Sodruzhestva. //Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 
1998, N 11-12. 
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meetings of plenipotentiaries of member-countries of theTreaty in the presence of the General 
Secretary of the CCS as often as required, but as a rule, not rare than once in a month. 
The Secretariat of the Council of collective security has been created as a constant body of the 
CCS, where the plenipotentiaries of countries-members of the Treaty are accredited. The 
Secretariat is responsible for elaboration of projects of documents for the highest bodies of the 
Council of collective security. It is in the framework of the Secretariat where states can 
exchange their points of view on specific problems of international relations in the region.  
Among the principle aims of the Tashkent Treaty there are such ends as to proclaim the 
creation of the collective security system of the member-States, the encouragement of the 
intentions of the Treaty on Collective Security state-members to create a defensive unions, the 
preservation of the military infrastructure, the abstinence from the participation in the military 
unions and blocs directed against any Treaty on Collective Security state-member. Besides, it 
deals with the transfer to the principle of the military deployment, which should strictly 
regulate the Russian military basis’ legal state in the ex-soviet republics. 
 
A heavy blow for the ambitions of Moscow was the defeat in the first Chechen war 
(1994-1996). After the Hasaviurt (August 1996) in the Ministry of the Defence they hardly 
considered the power intervention of Russian into the resolving of the conflicts on the CIS 
territory seriously. And it was not only because of fear of being accused in the Russian neo-
imperialism to which Boris Yeltsin was very sensible, but also because of the lack of belief in 
the Russian army itself. The task appeared to revive the prestige and the authority of  the 
Army. This task was solved in part only  when  the Second Chechen War began in Autumn 
1999. 
After the Tashkent Treaty its member-States signed a number of documents 
developing the problems of the co-operation in the field of the collective security :   
Conception of the Collective Security, Declaration of the member-States of the Collective 
Security Treaty, Main Directions of the Extending of the TSC member-States co-operation. 
As Vladimir Zemsky, the General secretary of Council of the Collective Security, noted, “… 
the deficit of the political will, some mutual prejudices and the  lag of the process of  the 
practical realisation of the achieved agreements from the decision-making process.”
8 
                                                 
8 Zemskiy Vladimir V. Kollektivnaya bezopasnost na prostranstve Sodruzhestva. //Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 
1998, N 11-12. 
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In fact the Tashkent treaty after ten years it was signed, is not strengthened as the main 
organisation form of the CIS-members’ military co-operation. For instance, in one of the most 
important agreements between the CIS-members in the field  of the military co-operation, the 
Agreement on the creation of the Joint Air-Defence System of the CIS-members
9, the 
Collective Security Treaty is not even mentioned. At the same time not only the Joint Air-
Defence System but also a Committee of Co-ordination on Air-Defence System with 
representative of Russia being a head of it were constructed in the framework of this 
agreement, the Plan of  co-ordination  of forces and means of the Joint Air-Defence System. 
The Treaty names as a centre of common co-ordination a Central command post of the troops 
of the air-defence of the Russian Federation, thus Russia gave all infrastructures for this 
agreement. 
 
In December 1999 on the eve of the meeting of CIS ministers of defence some 
journalists inquired the secretary of the Council of ministers of defence of the CIS-countries 
Alexandr Sinajskiy whether this Council duplicated the bodies of the Treaty on Collective 
Security. The answer of the Russian diplomat was rather open and it showed the meaning of 
the Treaty on Collective Security for the CIS countries: " I can't agree with that. Among the 
questions, which are going to be discussed on the meeting of the Council of ministers of 
defence, only one sixth is for ministers from states that signed the Treaty on Collective 
Security. The rest is the common problems which more or less concern all countries".
10 
 
The first deputy of a head of the General Staff of Russian military forces General 
Valerij L. Manilov made another attempt to justify the need  of co-operation of the CIS-
countries in a military sphere, which had to be against a theory of a mono-polar world and 
those who support it (the USA and the NATO).  He thinks that: " The opposition of these 
trends  (to the mono- or multi-polar world – S.T.) causes main threats to the stability, security 
and peace. It is an objective process and we should estimate it and see its results."
11 Therefore 
Russia keeps a right to form unions and to develop "special relations" in a military sphere 
with States which also share an anxiety about a mono-polar world. But there is no such State 
                                                 
9 This Agreement was signed by leaders of the CIS countires on February 10, 1995 in the capital of Kazakhstan – 
Almaty. Azerbaijan and Moldova didn’t signed it, and Belarus, Turkmenistan and Ukraine signed with some 
important reservations. 
10 Mukhin Vladimir. Voennye ministry SNG vstretyatsya v Moskve. //Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 21, 1999. 
11 Manilov Valeri L. O voennoy doktrine Rossii.//Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, N 5, 2000, p. 42. 
   11 
at the territory of the CIS (with an exception of the Ukraine). Instead the idea of a multi-polar 
world is very popular among the ruling elite of China and India.    
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3. The main actors: Russia, NATO and CIS countries 
 
The amount of Russian power structures, which in the 90ies was able to influence the 
defense policy and determine relationship between Russia and NATO, was rather large. First 
of all, the President of Russia and his administration should be pointed. During his presidency 
(1991-1999) Boris Yeltsin paid a special attention to the CIS, which was in particular obvious 
because of his absolute indifference to the foreign policy and his wish to have contacts only 
with a close circle of leaders of main countries of the world. Many experts estimated his wish 
to keep the CIS as an attempt to make up in the memory of descendants for a Belovezhye 
agreement, which fixed the disintegration of the USSR. Boris Yeltsin seemed to want to keep 
the CIS till he stayed in the Kremlin.  And he has never issued any too important challenges 
to the Commonwealth as well as to other subordinate to him power structures. 
 
The government of Russia in a whole and within it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Defense Ministry are the second institutions by their importance for the foreign policy of 
Russia.  The collapse of the USSR opened for them new spheres of activity, which had never 
been on the agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry of the USSR. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 1996 A. Kozyrev remarked once after his 
resignation that it had taken about 80% of his working time to deal with problems of the CIS 
thus the time which had been left for other regions and problems had been minimal
12.  The 
President of Russia didn't have any real interest of the activity of the government 
establishments in the CIS countries, which was combined with a lack of experience, trained 
specialists and means.   
 
For the legislature a discussion of problems of the ex-republics of the USSR has 
become fast and the most popular topic. At the same time because the State Duma and the 
Council of Federations and the legislatures in Russian regions didn't have any real possibility 
to influence the CIS policy of Russia the irresponsibility of the opinions expressed and even 
legislative acts passed is surprising.  For instance, Russian legislators announced the 
disintegration of the USSR illegal and intended to declare an impeachment to B. Yeltsin for 
his actions, which had resulted in the collapse of the USSR. 
                                                 
12 According to current practice, The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is playing the leading and coordinating 
role among all governmental institutions and regions, which are involved in foreign relations, not just political, 
but also economic, cultural etc.   13 
 
Russian Mass Media in 1991-1999 draw very small attention to the CIS problems with 
an exception of such items as Sebastopol, rights of the Russian-speaking population of the 
Baltic countries, and the Union between Russia and Belorussia.  The Caucasus policy of 
Russia, the Chechen war and the threat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were reported 
routinely as well. As for the other questions, even one of such crucial importance as Russian 
relationship to the Ukraine and Kazakhstan were reported only if they got into the sphere of 
"presidential diplomacy". The professionalism of journalists and scholars, who publicized 
their articles in periodicals, significantly increased during this period. If at the beginning of 
the decade the most publications about the CIS appeared in a form of report then now 
analytical articles and discussions took the first place and attract large attention.  
 
The CIS issues were an item of small importance for the power structures of Russia 
but the NATO-Russian relations was an opposite case. Each action taken by NATO or Russia 
attracted a large attention in Russia, coursed pointed debates, discussed in the parliament, in 
the Mass Media and became a main topic of international conferences and researches. Thus 
the current "division of labor" in between these two topics was formed: a well-known 
Alliance and an almost unknown Commonwealth turned out to be put together in the mid-
90
th. The first reaction of Russia (which it still sticks to) was an anxiety and a wish to prevent 
NATO from any penetration to the CIS, even in form of mutual exchange of representatives, 
communication officers, not to mention the opening of Informative Centers of NATO.  The 
ideal for Russia was the CIS countries communicating with NATO through Russia. But 
NATO had no reason to agree with such pattern. That was why Russia and NATO turned out 
to be in opposition to each other in the question of the CIS when NATO in January 1994 
proposed the Partnership for Peace program and a lot of CIS-countries including Russia 
supported it and signed later.  
 
Russian military forces are, of course, very important for our research. Russian official 
information about the strength of the Russian military forces is lacking. In accordance to the 
estimations of foreigner specialists the Russian military forces include more than 1.2 million 
of military, there are about 22.000 tanks in a military units and at a depots, 26.000 units of 
another armored technique, 21.000 units of artillery techniques, 2000 anti-aircraft missiles, 
1800 military aircraft of the air forces, air-defense forces and naval forces, 900 shock-  14 
helicopters, 40 multipurpose atomic and diesel submarines and 140 surface military ships of 
the main classes. 
 
The influence of the CIS factor on Russian policy and day-to-day life was increased 
with a migration. Since the collapse of the USSR about 4 million people migrate to Russia 
from ex-Soviet countries (about one fourth was illegal).  Though such inflow of population 
will have a positive influence upon Russia in a long run at the crises of the beginning 90
th it 
made worse social-economic problems in the country and destabilized a situation in some 
regions (in particular in the Northern Caucasus). 
 
Since Vladimir Putin has become a president significant changes have taken place in a 
power structure, involved into the solution of the CIS problems.   After just another dismissal 
of the Ministry of the CIS affairs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Economic policy and trade shared its functions. But both of them were focused only on their 
day-to-day work and the Security Council of Russia and its secretor Sergey Ivanov were 
authorized to elaborate Russian common politics at the post-Soviet area. Originally the status 
of the Security Council secretor within Russian power hierarchy was not high. It increased 
drastically in the second half of 90s, in particular since Putin has got this post.  The Security 
Council, which is formally a deliberative body of the President of the State, has become 
nowadays a forum of power ministers, representatives of the president administration, heads 
of both parliament chambers and also representatives of the president in 7 federal districts. At 
the meetings of the Council all the most important questions of Russian security and text of 
program documents, which lay down approach of Russia to its internal and external policy, 
are discussed. The post-Soviet area attracts a very  wide attention of Russian politicians that is 
why a key role in an elaboration and implementation of Russian policy in this region is plaid 
by Sergey Ivanov, which is, by accounts of some experts, one of five the most influential 
Russian politicians. Some specialists give him even a second place because he is closely 
connected to President Putin and because he has got from the latter very wide authorities
13.  
As Sergey Ivanov got a post of the Defense Minister it seems to be that elaboration of Russian 
CIS policy will be shifted from the Security Council to the Defense Ministry.  
In 2000-2001 an interest to the CIS policy of Russia has increased among the political 
elite as well as among civil society of Russia. There were several reasons: 
                                                 
13 Chubchenko, Yu. Sovbez Rossii vossoedinyaet SNG. – Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 15, 2000. P. 11   15 
1)  large interest of the Russian president to the CIS agenda and his often visits to the States 
of the Commonwealth: 
2)  the formation of a conceptual basis of Russian policy in the CIS in 1999-2000. 
 
It’s too early to say that Russia has managed to articulate its priorities in relations with 
its nearest neighbors. But the National Security Concept (January 2000), the Foreign Policy 
Concept (June 2000) and the Military Doctrine (2000) have stated common parameters for the 
Russian policy in the region and the whole world. It also destroyed a possibility for skeptics 
to speak about a neo-imperialism of Russia and a hope of ultra-patriots upon a forced 
reintegration. These documents are not positive for foreign countries. For instance, the most 
important document, The Conception of National Security mentions among threats for Russia 
security, the West.  
 
In accordance to the foreign Mass Media it means that Russia and the West are again 
becoming enemies.
14 The main military threat for Russia, as the Conception points it, is a shift 
of the NATO to a peace-enforcement out of the zone of the responsibility of the NATO 
without sanction of the UN Security Council, which is becoming a strategic doctrine of the 
NATO.  
 
There were always two opposite approaches to the NATO in the post-Soviet area.  
 
One of them was based on the idea that the Alliance, which unites the most developed 
countries of Europe and the Northern America, can bring stability to any region of the world. 
It’s enough to establish constructive relations with NATO and the American-European 
umbrella will soften security problems of a separate country.  
 
Another approach paid more attention to specific characteristics of a military part of  
NATO and to the insignificant battle experience of the Alliance. Though NATO has up-to-
date military technology but it used it very rarely. The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo 
demonstrated the Alliance is not really efficient for operations in an alien in terms of 
civilization society. In particular if the conflict is far from the zone of responsibility of the 
NATO. As for the post-Soviet area it is possible hypothetically to delegate the function of 
                                                 
14 Sokolovski, Maksim. Vykapyvaya topor vojny, Rossiya brosaet vyzov Zapadu. – Zerkalo nedeli, Kiev, 
January 22, 2000   16 
control and direct intervention to one of the NATO's countries (Turkey) or one of the allies of 
the USA (Pakistan and other Arabic countries). But it’s hardly possible that the NATO 
countries will use that mechanism. The matter is that the intervention of any regional 
superpower in Caucasian or Middle Asian problems will cause a resistance of its rivals. There 
are such rival countries in the Caucasus and the Middle Asia as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and China. For example, not only these countries but also almost all developed 
countries of the world are interested in the Caspian oil. That means that the new “Big Game” 
in the region of the Caspian Sea and along lines of the oil transportation will not be limited 
with rival of two countries, as it was in the 19
th century.  Nowadays this game will involve 
almost the whole Europe and the USA. But it’s absolutely impossible to imagine the NATO 
forces placed in this region to guarantee a safe transportation oil from Baku to Jeihan.    
 
That is why both these approaches to the co-operation with NATO turned out to be 
unrealistic. NATO is for some of the CIS-countries a way of getting episodic military-
technical or limited financial aid. At the same time the level of the contacts with NATO helps 
to bargain with Russia about credits, access to Russian transport infrastructures and favorable 
access of goods to Russian market. In a critical situation (for instance, some crises in the 
Middle Asia connected to the Talibs who are moving to the North to the CIS-frontiers)   
NATO and the CIS are not even mentioned because the USA is unable to restrict or stop the 
activities of Usama ben Laden and other terrorists who have their centers in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and some other Asian Muslim countries.  
 
One of the important aims of Russia in the post-Soviet area is to create and to use in 
the framework of the Tashkent Treaty or its modification peacemaking rapid reaction forces, 
which will be able to be used under the UN.  In this case the UN, as Russia sees it, should 
become a counterweight to the NATO, what will evoke rejection of the NATO-countries.  In 
the opinion of Moscow the OSCE can also be an alternative to the NATO.  In 1995 Russian 
diplomats managed to convince heads of all countries of the Treaty on Collective Security, 
except Azerbaijan, to sign the following text of the Decision of the Collective Security 
Council: “ The participating States regard proposed by the NATO program “The Partnership 
for Peace” as an alternative to the mechanical expansion of the NATO. They consider that its 
realization should aim at the construction of the universal common European structure of the   17 
military-political co-operation, which will strength the CIS-foundation.”
15 Later the 
importance of the OSCE for the Russian politics has decreased.  
 
The Russia-NATO relations turned out to be in crisis immediately after the beginning 
of the NATO operation in Kosovo in March 1999. The reaction of the Russian public opinion 
and almost of all CIS-countries to the bombing was negative.  But only Russia and Belorussia 
have made corresponding blaming statement at the high State level. Moreover, Russia 
suspended almost all contacts with the NATO.  And only a year after that, relations started to 
be re-established gradually. 15-16 of February 2000 J. Robinson visited Russia first after 
Kosovo conflict. As “Nezavisimaja gazeta” pointed out the main aim of his visit was the 
following: “The European member-countries of NATO and mainly the USA are in an 
inconvenient position. They understand quite well that it is impossible to minimize the role of 
Russia in a current situation and try to increase this role to the level, which will satisfy 
Russia.”
16  After that in May 2000 in Florence the decision was made to open the NATO 
Information Office in Moscow.
17 In this year the Joint Permanent Council Russia-NATO 
resumed its work but with a limited agenda. 
   
It has become necessary to articulate the basic principles of the Russian foreign policy 
in the beginning of 1993, when the country has moved out from the edge of economic 
catastrophe. Russian diplomats played the key role in the development of international 
contacts of the country and of the various programs of international emergency aid to it. They 
also helped Russia to quickly join a number of important international economic 
organizations. Therefore, when the "crisis management task" of the Russian Foreign Ministry 
was fulfilled, the Kremlin ordered to define priorities of the country's foreign policy. The 
main priority was defined as relations with the CIS member States, which could not help 
disappointing the West, which hoped to remove Russia from the post-Soviet area and leave it 
the role of its smaller partner. According to A. Kvasov, "By the beginning of 1993 Russia has 
achieved international recognition and a special role on the former Soviet territory, which 
made skeptics both inside and outside the country critic that policy for "neo-imperialism"
18. 
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Russia never lacked politicians, who viewed the co-operation with the CIS skeptically. 
Usually such skeptics belong to economists of different political views or to the right and 
center-right forces. According to the economists, Russia is not able to "feed" the CIS, 
therefore, the aim of Russia inside the CIS must be a non-conflict deconstruction of the Soviet 
Union. The rightists analyzed the issue from the other side: according to them, Russia is the 
most democratic State among the CIS members, therefore, its co-operation with less 
democratic partners may lead not to the increase of democracy in the partner countries, but to 
the rise of authoritarianism in Russia itself. That tendency looked inevitable in the situation, 
when the economic crisis in Russia continued and therefore the country was not able to lead 
the re-integration process. The volume of economic links between Russia and the CIS 
member States continued to decline (by now it has fallen down to 25 per cent of Russian 
foreign trade). Any re-integration in the CIS lacked an economic basement and became 
vulnerable and dependent on the good will of Russia's leaders and their ambitions to compete 
with the West in the post-Soviet area. The crisis of the CIS has become evident in mid-90ies. 
One may find the consequences of the crisis anywhere: in the low effectiveness of the CIS 
summits, in the CIS decisions' rare coming in power, in the different approaches to security 
issues. The CIS member-States have become to view differently the nature of threat 
(terrorism, internal opposition, international crime, foreign military threat) and therefore also 
the nature of security (neutrality, non-alignment, membership in the Tashkent Treaty, co-
operation with NATO). NATO as a security factor in the post-Soviet area appeared also in 
mid-90ies. In practice the statements on closer co-operation with NATO and probable 
application to join the Alliance (especially those by the governments of the Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia) were addressed more to Moscow than to Brussels. Those statements have 
become a part of the political maneuver in the post-Soviet area. Russia has always reacted 
very painfully to such statement, especially after the Madrid (1997) summit of NATO, where 
three East European countries were accepted into the Alliance.  
 
It has become popular in many post-Soviet States to discuss the upcoming collapse of 
the CIS. The political elite of Russia has also become more skeptical to the future of the 
Commonwealth. One may characterize the current situation this way: there is no need in the 
CIS, but the costs of its deconstruction are bigger than the costs of preservation of the 
Commonwealth in its current state. That situation will hardly change in the near future. 
Therefore, The current period of stagnation in the CIS may continue for many years, if Russia   19 
does not change radically its foreign policy neither invests huge resources into re-integration 
of the post-Soviet area. 
 
The critical spot of the military co-operation inside the CIS and of the Tashkent Treaty 
as such was the beginning of 1999. In April 1999 the term of the Tashkent Treaty exceeded. 
Several countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan) quitted the treaty
19. Each of the 
countries had their own motivation, when they signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992 
– 1993
20. Uzbekistan hoped to enforce its pressure on Tajikistan, also via placing its protegees 
to various important posts in the country, however, Russia opposed that. Azerbaijan hoped to 
make Russia refuse from providing energetic aid to Armenia, but failed. Georgia had the same 
expectations on Russia in relation to Abkhazia, but failed as well. Remaining members of the 
CIS, those countries demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the Russia's foreign policy, 
quitting the Tashkent Treaty. However, Russia, which foreign political position was swinging 
from greater support to the CIS to its factual deconstruction, did not react tragically to that. It 
only made Russia change its foreign priorities from multilateral to bilateral co-operation with 
the CIS countries in the limited number of spheres. 
 
The collapse of the Tashkent Treaty took place in the same time with the military 
crisis in Kosovo. Therefore, the public opinion in Russia accepted it even more painfully. The 
Government of Yevgeniy Primakov at that time attempted to change radically the character of 
links with the CIS member-States, which included the demand to pay off all debts to Russia. 
However, that led only to worsening of bilateral relations, especially in case of Uzbekistan, 
which not only refused to pay off the debts, but also closed the access of Russian companies 
to the most attractive objects of property in the country. The same situation took place in the 
other countries as well. 
 
One of the most important motivations of the CIS member states to continue military 
co-operation is their need to maintain military security via co-operation in the field of military 
industry. That includes joint development of compatible military industrial products, in 
production of arms, which would be able to meet the modern requirements
21. Over 7000 
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enterprises took part in military production in the Soviet Union, over 1000 of them were 
located outside Russia. The democratic Russia inherited over 80% of the military industrial 
complex of the USSR. However, the level of specialization in the Soviet Union was so high 
that currently Russia produces over 82% of types of its military supply in co-operation with 
the CIS member states
22.  
 
In 1994 to solve a problem of the co-operation in a military-technical sphere and 
military-economic integration in the framework of the CIS a special body with a function of 
co-ordination was created – Intergovernmental Commission on Military-economic Co-
operation. As in the most of the CIS activities the success of the activity of this commission 
and integration of a military industry at the former USSR depended on Russian position. But 
the longstanding crises and constant reforms of the management of Russian defense industry 
resulted in a break of practically all relations in this sphere in the 90s.  
 
In the sphere of a weapon production and military technique the CIS countries are 
interested in the co-operation with Russia, because despite a fact that almost all CIS countries 
have military industry, the final production of the military products is concentrated in Russia. 
Among approximately 55.000 institutions which worked for the defense (defense works, 
design offices and research institutions) 73 per cent was located in Russia, 14 per cent in  
Ukraine and in other republics from 3 to 1 per cent
23. It is hardly possible to create new works 
of the defense industry for the CIS-partners of Russia. The huge invests are needed for that 
and no state at the post-Soviet space can afford to create a scientific and experimental basis. 
That is why the reanimation of a military industry is possible only through including of the 
national military industry to Russian one. For Russia such co-operation can cause the 
competition with its own factories but it is profitable for it in terms of economics and politics 
in the most cases.  It is obvious that it is irrational to produce military goods together and at 
the same time to be opponents in a military-political and even in military sphere. In 2000-
2001 the Ukraine and Uzbekistan demonstrated the understanding of that fact when their 
presidents signed some agreements about a co-operation in the production of up-to-date 
                                                 
22 Kuznetsova, L.I. & Kuzmenko V.P. Integratsionnye i desintegratsionnye faktory mnogovektornyh protsessov 
na evropeyskom i postevropeyskom prostranstvah. – Polityka i chas. Kiev, 1998, # 9. P. 17-18 
23 Benediktov, M. & Khrustalev, E. Integratsiya voennoy industrii stran SNG. – Mirovaya ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 1998, # 12, p. 138   21 
weapons
24.   The co-operation in a weapon production between Belorussia and Russia is even 
closer. Other CIS countries also show quite regularly that they are ready to take part in a joint 
weapon production. Russia tried to make a sphere of a military production more or less 
transparent.   
 
For instance, many enterprises of the Russian military industrial complex were 
privatized. In 1996 – 1997 the Russian government adopted the federal program of 
restructuring of the complex, which was fulfilled in 1998 – 2000. In 1998 Russia and the 
Ukraine decided to fulfill the program of economic co-operation for the upcoming three years. 
The program included bilateral supplies of arms and know-how in the military sphere, 
maintenance of co-operation between the enterprises of the military industrial sector and co-
ordination of military exports in order to avoid competition on the world market. Russian 
military reform pays much attention to production of arms; the discussion in the field is open 
to public, though it leads to dissatisfaction of the government
25.  
 
Becoming independent, the CIS member-States lost their image of military strong 
countries, which they inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia lost the vast part of such image 
during the first military campaign in Chechnya. However, it is not logical to suggest that 
Russia is military weak, since they basic part of the Russian defense system includes nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery. The second military campaign in Chechnya made a 
positive impact in the Russian security image, when it showed that the main enemy of 
Russian troop in Chechnya is not a regular army but small groups of terrorists, which use their 
own military tactics. It is quite difficult for the Russian troops to adjust to that tactics, 
especially in the circumstances, when foreign countries and mass media diligently watch their 
activities in the region. 
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4. Relations of Russia and Baltic States (issues of military security)  
NATO is, still, excuse me, not about distribution of 
jam and tomatoes. This is a military organization. 
People there are dry, angry, military... That’s why I 
see no reason for Baltic people ... to enter into 
NATO. 
 
Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the Committee on 
International Affairs of the State Duma of Russia.
26 
 
This comment of prominent Russian politicians, the Chairman of a leading 
parliamentary committee Dmitry Rogozin, was published in section of jokes and reservations 
of Russian politicians and governmental officials in a popular Russian weekly magazine. Of 
course, it is a joke, but it reflects perfectly quality and level of seriousness of Russian 
objections to the NATO enlargement into Baltic states.  
The Baltic region, extended from traditional three post-Soviet States to significant 
territory of the Baltic Sea region is a proving ground for broader conception of security in 
post-Cold war times. Although old boundaries and relationships do not readily fade away, 
military security shares the attention in Europe’s northeast with economic, environmental, 
energy and cultural security. But “hard” security still dominates in discussion on future of the 
region. A decade after the Cold War and independence for all three Baltic States, the region 
continues to wrestle with two essential security issues. 1) How does the region fit into 
European and Transatlantic structures? 2) What role can, should, or must the region play in 
the settlement of the much larger question of continental security building? NATO is the 
leading institution which may provide security into the region, according to prevailing 
opinion of ruling political elites in the Baltic states, that’s why we may easily find evidences 
of interest of both Moscow and Brussels to the region. 
Relations between Russia and the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in 
1990ies were characterized by definition of low-intensity crisis. At the beginning it was 
“crisis of mutual understanding” between two democratic ruling elites, but quite soon it was 
replaced by the “crisis of trust” after Russian troops have left the territory of the Baltic states 
in 1994. Approximately since1994 new period of relations started, when besides the rapid 
development of economic relations there were very limited political contacts and practically 
total absence of cooperation in military sphere. New situation was a paradoxical one: security   23 
in the Baltic region was dependent on atmosphere of relations between Russia and Western 
countries, but there were newly independent Baltic States, which could have provoked sharp 
crisis between Russia and the West.
27 
As a result of 1994 removal of military troops and hardware, all non-economic reasons 
for good relations with Russia for Baltic countries have disappeared. There were several 
reasons for that. First and the most important was, that with Russian troops out of their 
territory the Baltic states felt no threat from their giant Eastern neighbor. Another reason for 
“cold peace” in the region was that politics of newly independent states towards Russian-
speaking population was far from totally democratic, and new elite in Tallinn, Riga and 
Vilnius were very unpleased by criticism from Moscow (even if the same type of criticism 
they have heard from the OSCE and some European capitals). And finally, Baltic States were 
actively trying to oppose their obvious political and economic successes with permanent and 
complex crisis in all CIS countries with Russia as one of the most suffered from the crisis. 
Compared to growth of authoritarian regimes in the Caucasus and central Asia as well as 
economic instability and lack of legitimacy of new elite in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and 
Belarus, the Baltic countries are a “fortress of stability”. Russian threat (doesn’t matter – real 
or virtual) could destroy the idyll. That’s why ritual mentioning of Russia as a threat to former 
USSR republics on the Baltic sea became integral part of their foreign policy and rhetoric in 
the international arena. NATO countries or Alliance itself have never officially reacted to that, 
but there was a strong impression in Moscow, that they have shared concern of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania for their security. In the situation of this “war of words”, Baltic States 
were expecting and are expecting now on powerful political support from the USA as well as 
finance assistance from the European Union, since traditional geopolitics pays special 
attention to access to open seas and this “science” was and still is popular both in Russia and 
among some officials in the West. The region in general plays now very important role in 
relations between the West and the East.
28 Estonia, as leader in this “rush to the West” among 
three Baltic countries, had the least cooperative relations with Moscow, especially prior to 
1998, when it was named as one of first candidates to the European Union.
29 
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Regional cooperation in the security issues, and first of all – Russian-Baltic cooperation 
– is the most important component of stability in North-Eastern Europe and North-Western 
Russia. But at the same time successful development of cooperation in this sensitive area will 
promote the Baltic States arguments in favor of their future NATO membership.
30 Because of 
that, Baltic States for many years have been totally rejecting important for Russia idea of 
improvement of regional security and joint international guarantees to security and territorial 
integrity of three States. Reason for inflexible policy - indispensable wish of Russia to 
participate in these guarantees.  
Their wish to become full members of NATO the Baltic states had expressed among 
first in central and Eastern Europe. In response to the move, in agenda of Russian politics in 
the Baltic region new issue appeared : on measures of trust and guarantees of security, which 
Moscow would like to provide to Baltic States. Officially, Prime-Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin have presented this idea in September 1997, and the President B.Yeltsin 
repeated and developed these measures in December 1997 during his visit to Sweden. 
President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas have received official Russian proposition on 
international guarantees to the three Baltic States during his official visit to Moscow in 
October of the same year. But reaction of all three Presidents was immediate and negative; in 
December 1997 at the Palanga Summit of leaders of the Baltic States they declared Russian 
guarantees as unacceptable for their countries.
31 That move can be evaluated as the highest 
point of “Cold peace” period in contemporary history of the region. Everything, that happened 
after that in Russian-Baltic relations (not so much really happened) still carried stamp of 
conflict and confrontation. But in the initial stage very important event defined future 
processes – in January 1998 the Baltic countries and USA had signed the Charter on 
Partnership, which was estimated in Moscow as a delay in accession of the three countries to 
NATO.
32  
Another important factor for security of the region was the Northern European Initiative 
(NEI) of the USA. Announced by the State Department in 1997, the NEI is intended to 
encourage prosperity, cooperation and integration in the Baltic North through linkages with 
European and Euro-Atlantic Institutions.
33 The U.S. Ambassador to Finland elaborated the 
Baltic significance in a 1998 speech: “I am not revealing a state secret if I suggest that if one 
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was asked a few years ago to draw up a short list of the toughest issues we thought we would 
face in European security, the Baltic issue would have been on that list”.
34 The Baltic element 
of the NEI is founded on the U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership (1998). The Baltic Charter is 
the starting point for U.S.-Baltic cooperation in many spheres, including international military 
cooperation in the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA), the Baltic Airspace 
Management Regime (BaltNat), and the NATO Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. 
 
Estonia more actively than its Baltic neighbors was trying to play the card of GUUAM 
in relations with Russia and other CIS countries. GUUAM was created in 1997 by Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. These four States had become disenchanted with the CIS, 
and they sought a regional organization that would more directly meet their needs. Uzbekistan 
joined the organization in April 1999. The main goals of GUUAM are to support territorial 
integrity of member-States and create another pole of integration in former USSR – without 
Russia as a leader. 
In principle, GUUAM is one of the most promising organizations for Estonian foreign 
policy in the post-Soviet area. Purely economic content of the GUUAM (construction of oil- 
and gas-pipelines) is not so much interesting for Tallinn. Another situation with military 
cooperation.  In principle, any form of military cooperation of Russian neighbors without 
involvement of Moscow may be seen as oriented on weakening of Russian security. It was not 
an accident, that when during visit to Tbilisi the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves he got a question from journalists “What are perspectives for co-
operation between GUUAM and the Baltic countries?”, his answer was: “I think the 
perspectives are very good”.
35 
In 1998-2000 atmosphere of confrontation in Russian-Baltic relations began to cool and 
the relations for outside observers appeared as less conflict and more civilized.  Such 
evaluation is based not only on external factors (absence of sharp statements and artificially 
loud propagandistic campaigns), but also on well-known facts of economic interest of the 
Baltic States in access to Russian market, as well as in Russian transit and growing share of 
Russian investments in all three countries, especially in Latvia. There are about 1.100 
companies with Russian investments in Latvia, whose total capital is about $100 million. 
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Gradually, Russian policy in the Baltic region became more consecutive. Recognizing 
situation on the region as favorable from the point of view of security, Russia is attempting to 
follow the course on recognition of special status of the Baltic region as the zone of low 
military activity. It seems, the ultimate purpose of Russia is the creation of working regional 
model of European security in the European North. Moscow is ready to recognize as 
“working” that model, in which it would be able to play an outstanding role, and at the same 
time the region itself would not be divided in several zones with different level of 
involvement of Russia. If to recognize as a reality that in the near future Sweden and Finland 
will not become members of NATO, then in fact all efforts oriented on keeping untouched of 
existing security architecture in the region are limited for Russia by non-NATO status of the 
Baltic states (or more broadly – nonparticipation of the three countries in any military 
alliance). This activity of Moscow is directed equally against NATO and the European Union, 
if the EU create effective military structure, which would be capable to function without US 
involvement. At the moment it seems very unlikely to several Russian experts who have been 
interviewed by authors. The Baltic region traditionally has tranquil political landscape, which 
was defined by peaceful co-existence of USSR/Russia with NATO countries and neutral 
states of the region. That’s why Moscow avoid regretting for inflexibility of leaders of the 
Baltic States, who would like transform the security landscape of the region in such a radical 
way. Russia is trying to combine energetic diplomatic activity with means of economic 
diplomacy. The centerpiece of its economic efforts for securing political and military status-
quo is now a program of construction of several sea-ports in the Baltic region, among them 
Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Batareynaya Bay and Sea Port “Saint-Petersburg” and main elements. 
Another rather effective tool of economic pressure on one of three countries – Latvia - 
in Russia’s hands is draft of federal law “On measures of Russian Federation directed on 
prevention of violation of basic rights and freedoms of citizens of Russia and Russian 
compatriots in the Republic of Latvia”. The draft of the law have already passed two readings 
in the State Duma and can come into force at any moment. According to appreciation of 
Russian experts, implementation of the law may lead to annual economic losses up to $300 
million due to technical barriers to Russian transit trade through territory of Latvia. At the 
same time losses of Russian (mostly private) companies will be about $30 million.
36 Perhaps, 
the most distinctive distinction of the Putin’s era and the era of Yeltsin is that in current 
situation Russian business is ready to obey any order from the Kremlin without very long 
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discussions and search for concessions from the Presidential Administration and government. 
Of course, at the same time this situation will lead to outflow of capital, but currently the size 
of the problem is much less compared to early-mid 1990s. 
 
It looks like on of the most firm convictions of Vladimir Putin is that the NATO 
enlargement is irrational and brings instability and threat to countries of the former USSR, 
and especially – to the Baltic States. Arguments of the Kremlin on the problem are well-
known. But it looks like Russia’s arguments are oriented not on basing its position in 
diplomatic debate, but once and forever fix desire of Moscow to keep between its own 
territory and NATO countries a sort of “ cordon sanitaire ” from former Soviet republics, 
including three Baltic States. In this situation Russia is not even trying to provide needed 
arguments for its choice. Symbolic meaning gas one of the first official statements on foreign 
policy issues, which had been done very soon after inauguration of Vladimir Putin by Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On May 19
th, 2000 Alexander Avdeev, a First Deputy of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs took part in a session of the State Duma and said: “Joining of the 
NATO by the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine will lead to fundamental revision of relations 
of Russian Federation and the Alliance”
37 Opposition to the second wave of the NATO 
eastward enlargement is for Alexander Avdeev one of the priorities for his ministry. There is 
no official statements or even discussions about possible ways of Russia’s reaction on the 
enlargement. That’s why there is enough space for speculations for radical politicians and 
researchers. For Nadezhda Arbatova from Russian Academy of Science, the most probable 
consequence of the NATO enlargement to the Baltic States will be the creation of “…full-
scale military union of Russia and Belarus, including deployment of Russian troops and 
dislocation of nuclear weapons of territory of Belarus”.
38 Another Russian scholar, Dmitry 
Trenin consider that it will be Baltic region, which play in future role of “good ground, 
laboratory of multilevel and various cooperation between Russia and the West, and it will be 
first element of “the Great Europe of Future”.
39 
 
The NATO eastward enlargement to the Baltic States is continuing to be a very 
important issue for Russian foreign policy, even more important then issues of architecture of 
European security with growing role of the European Union. First of all – Russia is not totally 
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sure that there is 100% guarantee that “Baltic” enlargement will take place in reality in 2002. 
There are arguments against the enlargement not only from Russian side, but from some other 
countries, who are members of both NATO and EU. Important argument for Russia’s final 
acceptance of the enlargement is the thesis that Russia has too much economic interests in 
access of national resources to markets of countries, which are the NATO members, and at 
final stage of discussion economic arguments will prevail over all others. We think that in 
practice situation of Russia’s dependence on European markets is not so much synonymous. 
Major part of currency inflow to Russia from European markets is related to export of energy. 
Oil, which is one of key Russian export goods, is trading on exchanges, that’s why fears that 
NATO countries will be able to organize boycott of Russian oil seems unreal in situation, then 
the UN will never support the boycott. Situation with Russian natural gas is totally different – 
Russia is dependent from Europe in this issue. But even here there is not so much choice for 
both sides; Russia trades natural gas by prices of world market via existing system of pipe-
lines. Decision of Europe to replace Russian natural gas by gas from Norway or Algeria will 
be very costly one and opposite to currently existing tendency of the EU to develop dialogue 
with Russia in energy sector. That’s why it is too early to speak about real interdependence of 
Russia and Europe. Both sides have to create the interdependence, and such problems as 
NATO enlargement to the Baltic States or military operation in Kosovo and lack of will to 
defend Macedonia make the task more complicated. The issue of membership of Baltic States 
in NATO may complicate international relations in the Baltic Rim. As we know, at the 
moment Denmark is active proponent of enlargement to all three Baltic States, but Finland 
and Sweden trying to distance themselves from the problem, simultaneously convincing 
leadership of  Latvia and Estonia in importance of developing better relations with Russia. 
Russia actively supported the tendency. For Moscow, it is objective and very positive 
tendency that Northern and Western Europe are not seeing it as source of military threat for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three Baltic States. That’s why, for instance, regular 
statements of Estonian leaders (chief of command of Estonian Defense Forces, admiral Tarmo 
Kouts and vice-chancellor of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harri Tiido) on 
opportunity to deploy on its territory nuclear weapons after becoming member of NATO, are 
seeing in Moscow as provocations, oriented on further deterioration of already very cool 
bilateral relations. 
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The NATO enlargement to the Baltic States will force Russia to undertake reactive 
measures, which from military and political point of view affect whole Northern European 
region. Strategic purpose of Russia in several regions of the world, and in Northern Europe 
first of others, is the same during last ten years – to secure status-quo, which existed at the 
moment of collapse of the USSR in form of balance of power between the West and the East 
in a very important European region. From Russian point of view, NATO enlargement will 
totally destroy the balance, which was very favorable for Moscow. There are enough serious 
and unsolved problems in the Baltic region from Russian point of view (securing Russian 
economic interests in the region and Russian-speaking minority are the most important), and 
that’s why Russia’s interest in the Baltic Rim is permanent. As the best scenario, NATO 
membership of the Baltic States will frost current positive dynamics in relations of Russia 
with Latvia and Estonia, as well as development of links between Russian regions in the 
North-West part of the country, and Estonia. Russia will have to revise priorities of its 
transport politics, forced private companies to export goods through sea ports in Leningrad 
and Murmansk regions. The optimum scenario for Russia – delay or total rejection of the idea 
of NATO enlargement to the Baltic States. It may, for Moscow, give Russia and European 
nations an opportunity to come back to Russia’s idea of 1997 on joint security guaranties to 
three Baltic States.  
   
Beginning of the year 2001 became a sort of borderline in relations of Russia and the 
Baltic States. More precisely, new tendencies appeared in relations of Moscow with Latvia 
and Lithuania
40, but not with Estonia. Formal expressions of the new course of Moscow were 
summits between the President of Russia and Presidents of Latvia (in January in small Alpine 
spa in Austria) and the President of Lithuania (in March in Moscow). During both summits 
the NATO enlargement was not the key topic of discussions, at least, according to official 
statements.
41 Just this interest to have dialog on the highest political level and readiness to 
move “NATO factor” out of the center of bilateral relations, at least for a while, can be seen 
as Moscow concession to its neighbors. But at the same time, these signals are quite 
ambiguous, if Moscow’s concession understand as sign to the Baltic States, that they are not 
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in practical politics independent in Trans-Atlantic relations and “serious” dialog Moscow is 
going to run in Brussels, Washington and Berlin. 
 
If Russia will be able to create and keep atmosphere of cooperation and even trust with 
some leading EU members, which are economically interested in Russian market and energy 
resources, then it is possible that in the year 2002 during the Prague Summit of NATO even 
powerful US pressure on its allies may not lead to the NATO enlargement to the Baltic 
region. Russia have made its first statement about negative attitude towards NATO 
enlargement after interest to be NATO member had been expressed in the Baltic capitals. But 
that fact doesn’t impede Moscow to utilize a great variety of tools and opportunities to 
express its dissatisfaction. It can be conveyed in trade sanctions and embargoes, reduction of 
diplomatic contacts to minimum, deployment of additional troops and nuclear weapons in the 
North-Western region of Russia. It is not clear if Europe would like to initiate tensions in one 
of the most stable and calm regions of the continent and the whole world. 
 
Very important factor of Baltic security politics is the position of Germany towards 
NATO enlargement. Historically, both Germany and Russia have been dominant players in 
the region. Today, both countries are again in a position to shape the region’s security. It is 
clear now, that for current generation of German leaders peace and security in Northern 
Europe cannot be established without constructive Russian involvement. None of German 
leaders have spoken out on the NATO enlargement towards Baltic countries since the Madrid 
NATO Summit in July 1997 voted for inviting Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the 
Alliance. In his June 2000 visit to Estonia and Latvia, addressing the Estonian parliament, 
Chancellor G. Schröder affirmed Russia’s role in Europe, declaring it of “strategic 
significance”. Speaking about need to involve Russia in decisions that concern Russia’s 
interests, he sent clear signal that the Baltic States can not expect to become members of 
NATO without Russian consent. The same type of signal Nordic countries of Sweden and 
Finland are sending to the three former USSR republics. It means that the NATO factor is 
very important in the region and coming NATO enlargement may lead to the creation of a 
new model of Russian-European relations or to new tensions and deterioration of atmosphere 
of stability. Main victims will be both Russia and the Baltic States, but not NATO itself and 
the Bush Administration as the most active advocate of the enlargement. For many Russian 
observers, chances of the Baltic States to become full members of NATO are getting smaller. 
The reason is that now world politics is changing its nature for more “realistic”. It means that   31 
artificial virtual threat for small Baltic States have to be graded as less important to problems 
of “high politics” – balance of power between Europe and the USA, between Western 
democracies and some Muslim countries (Afghanistan) and China. For all these “balances” 
NATO member-States need Russia.   32 
 
5.  Russia and Belarus – role of NATO for the Union state.  
As long as Lukashenko remains in power, Belarus will remain a 
maverick in the region while its domestic political and economic 
infrastructure continue to erode.
42 
Jessica Hand, Former HM Ambassador, Belarus 
Lt-Col Robert Hand, Former US Defence Attache, Belarus 
 
Close cooperation between Russia and Belarus started since 1994 when Alexander 
Lukashenko was elected the second head of state of independent Belarus. The main stages of 
development of the cooperation reflected in several bilateral agreements: Treaty on Union of 
Russia and Belarus; Treaty on military cooperation of Russia and Belarus; Agreement on joint 
guarantee of regional security between Russia and Belarus. 
  
Belarussian President A.Lukashenko has partly credited integration with Russia with the 
achievement of “stable economic growth” in Belarus, which has allegedly resulted in “a more 
effective tackling of social problems”.
43 The diplomatic positions of Belarus on the eastward 
enlargement of NATO has been practically identical to those of Russia, even more adversely 
in some moments of European political history of 1990ies (Kosovo conflict, of course, was 
one of them). Following the example of Russia, Minsk has proclaimed a “multi-vector” 
foreign policy. The principal aim of the policy was to give Belarus its own profile in 
international affairs, enabling it to be involved in European political and economic processes. 
When faced with Western hostile approach to his regime, Alexander Lukashenko made 
several times provocative statements. His most controversial statement have included a call 
for the formation of a Minsk-Moscow-Beijing axis.
44 The active use of Cold-war language 
lead to formation of his image in the CIS (mostly in Russia, Ukraine and his own country) as 
a staunch defender of Slavic-Orthodox unity, ostensibly threatened by the West in the form of 
NATO. 
 
Since the enlargement of NATO emerged as reality of European politics, the Belarus 
increased its calls to Russia for enhancement of the military aspects of integration with Russia 
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and turning the Union of Russia and Belarus into powerful and effective military alliance with 
joint army and military planning system. During a visit of Minister of Defense of Russia, Igor 
Sergeev to Minsk in 1998, his Belarussian colleagues reportedly assured him that Russia 
could – to all intents and purposes – regard Belarus as a Russian military district.
45 The key 
lesson from the Kosovo conflict, which Minsk have learned, was that unpredictable and 
undemocratic Belarus under Lukashenko’s leadership may become the object of a 
“humanitarian intervention”. Since spring 1999 anti-NATO standing of Minsk became official 
policy and, in many cases, the only way to deal with challenges of the European politics and 
relations of Minsk with western neighbors. Occasionally, there are conciliatory signals from 
Belarus towards NATO – in autumn 1999 Belarus has expressed reserved satisfaction with its 
participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and a wish to develop “normal 
relations” with the Alliance. But nobody took the signal very seriously, especially in the 
situation of Russia sharp financial crisis. 
 
The Russo-Belarusian Union is at the moment the most developed form of integration in 
the CIS area. In its genesis the union seems to repeat all major steps of European integration 
after the Second World War, which lead to the European Union. Now all key institution of 
European integration have their replica in the Russo-Belarusian Union: European Council, 
Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament and others. The only field where the 
Union is definitely ahead of the EU is military cooperation. Both countries have been 
advocating the development of a European security architecture around the OSCE, firmly 
opposing the current NATO-centric system and any expansion of the Alliance to the East.
46 
 
Inspiration from NATO practices in Kosovo is reflected in a Russo-Belarusian effort to 
develop rapid reaction forces. During his visit to Minsk in April 2000, President Putin 
announced the creation of a regional force, combining the whole of the Belarusian Armed 
Forces with the Moscow Military District, which was negotiated before and fixed in the 
Union Treaty. The force is to number up to 300 000 troops, which include military units, 
border control and ministries of interiors’ troops. This huge military unit has to be deployed 
on the territory of Belarus in case of an immediate external threat to its security. 
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Besides with the Union with Russia, Belarus concluded the Agreement on military 
union with Armenia in February 2000.
47 According to the logic of integration, next step in 
bringing Russia and Belarus together has to be membership of Armenia in the Russia-Belarus 
Union. There are many supporters of the idea in two Slavic countries as well as in Armenia, 
but nowadays possibility for this move is extremely low, mainly because of very cautious 
policy of Moscow in the Caucasus region, where Russia can not permit itself 
straightforwardness of Alexander Lukashenko. Russia have to construct very complex balance 
of power in relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Certainly, these two countries have much 
more significance for security of Russia compared to Yerevan, which possess support of 
powerful Armenian diaspora all around the world. 
  
For “filling by concrete substance of military part of the Treaty on Union state”
48 
Sergey Ivanov, newly appointed minister of Defense of Russia, visited Minsk in mid-April 
2001. It was his first foreign trip as a Minister of Defense, that’s why the visit has very 
important symbolic meaning, especially as signal to the West about real priorities in Russia’s 
military cooperation with its neighbors.  
  
Among questions under discussion in dialog of two countries were: The Military 
Doctrine of the Russia-Belarus Union; unification of legislation of the two countries in 
military sphere; functioning of regional grouping of two countries. During this visit as well as 
immediately after it, the topic of NATO appeared constantly in Russian and CIS media. The 
reason was – to explain need for further development of military cooperation between Minsk 
and Moscow. As an observer of the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” noted, the obvious threat to the 
Union state is “powerful military potential of the NATO Alliance and its permanent striving 
for its own enlargement by inclusion of next in turn Eastern European and Baltic States. Tens 
of divisions, equipped by the most up-to-date armaments, hundreds of NATO warships and 
combat planes, which are ready for use at any moment, are, objectively speaking, cocking-
piece, which can be pulled immediately”.
49 
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Relations of Belarus and Ukraine during 1990ies were far from perfect. Despite of the 
Agreement on free trade between the two countries, which was concluded in late 1990ies, 
economic cooperation of the countries is limited. Contacts in the military sector are even less 
intense. To some extent it can be explained by suspiciousness of Alexander Lukashenko to 
bringing together Ukraine and NATO in a period, when Boris Tarasyuk was the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Several Belarusian military exercises during late 1990ies have 
envisioned an enemy insurgent  from the Pripyat marshland – from the direction of Ukraine. 
This, probably was the result of Kiev’s engagement with NATO, and a demonstrated 
capability to hold joint military exercises with NATO members, particularly the United 
States. Belarus is locked also in fierce competition with Ukraine for predominance in the 
arena of relations with Moscow. Idea of construction of new gas pipe-line to Europe via 
territory of Belarus and Poland was hard blow for Ukraine and Belarus is very energetic to 
fulfil the plan. 
 
The Union of Russia and Belarus may play role of stabilizing factor in politically and 
militarily unstable territory of the CIS. It may demonstrate defensive nature of Russia’s and 
future Union’s Military Doctrines and raise trust to Moscow from the side of international 
community. But the same Union may become reason for painful troubles of Moscow, if the 
President A.Lukashenko continue to make irresponsible statements on behalf of the Union. 
Issues of military security on the European continent are very sensitive issue. And if Moscow 
was able to emerge finally, after ten years of instability as predictable and  stable partner in 
the international arena (despite of continuing problems in internal politics where Chechnya is 
issue number one), Belarus has very definite and unfavorable for Russia situation. As a matter 
of fact, the Union of Russia and Belarus will become the litmus test for Russia of Vladimir 
Putin. Moscow may begin its activity oriented on strengthening its own leadership in the CIS 
through export of institution of democratic society into other CIS countries, which much less 
devoted to respect of democratic legislation and procedures. And then Moscow may force the 
West to recognize and respect of its leadership and status of regional great power For all that 
both Russian leaders and their partners in Europe should be clear, that it is task for many 
years. And even simply stable Russia with predictable policy towards other former USSR 
countries, will be in practice great power besides other respected democracies in the world. If, 
in another scenario, the Russia-Belarus Union will be able to transform itself into a wider 
security system on the territory of the CIS countries, securing at the same time specific 
features of defense policy of Moscow, its historical mission would have global consequences.   36 
But for becoming reality, Moscow have to learn A.Lukashenko to live in accordance wish 
democratic laws.  It doesn’t seem realistic at the moment. 
  
The Union of Russia and Belarus as well as the President of Belarus are exceptionally 
popular among significant part of Russian diplomats and military. The same we may state 
about some public officials of some other CIS countries, who had interviews with authors of 
the report. Partly, this phenomenon can be explained by political preferences of people we 
have interviewed.  Practically all of them are former communists, missing for Soviet period, 
when military and diplomats were representing the superpower, but not countries who have 
defense budget which is not enough to buy even one modern military aircraft. Another 
important feature for understanding their views is that anti-western convictions, traditional for 
elite of Soviet era, became again strong after the Kosovo conflict, and now are part of 
mentality of Russian (Ukrainian, Belarussian, etc.) public officials nowadays. In times of the 
President Yeltsin it was rather difficult psychologically to share them – there were disorder all 
around CIS, and the lack of will-power and total corruption in the Kremlin. Compared to 
permanently ill B.Yeltsin, healthy and energetic A.Lukashenko was not bad at all, that’s why 
at least part of population sympathies and support, which in other situation would go to 
B.Yeltsin, went to the President of Belarus. The situation have changed totally since 2000. 
Compared to short-spoken, resolute and to some extent effective Vladimir Putin, 
A.Lukashenko looks amateur of politics, which by chance became at the top of power 
pyramid of his own country. It seems like Russia is excepting as an inevitable process slowly 
moving ahead integration with Belarus. It is clear for Moscow that A.Lukachenko has to be 
paid for his loyalty to Russia in late 1990s – early 2000s by political and financial support 
during the Presidential elections in Belarus in 2001 where he will be re-elected in any 
scenario. And it means that during next few years Belarus will follow all ups and downs of 
Russian policy towards NATO, and, as the result, keys from defense policy of Minsk will be 
preserved in Kremlin. Any “NATO factor” will not be able to take them out!    37 
6.  Ukraine and Moldova: Between Europe and Russia. 
For the first nine years following independence, Ukrainian 
foreign policy was directed westward, at eventual integration 
into European political and economic institutions. Last 
October, however, the first signs of an eastward shift 
appeared. 
 
A.Karatnycky.
50  
 
1) Ukraine 
 
Relations of Moscow and Kiev in 1990e represented continuous chain of conflicts, 
radical statements and promises, which were not fulfilled. Major steps in bilateral relations of 
the two countries are related to their security problems. Among them: sharp discussion of 
Kiev and Moscow about Sebastopol; the problem of signing Big Treaty on relations of Russia 
and Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR; position of Kiev towards integration in the CIS; 
Ukrainian debts for Russian energy  resources and especially – for natural gas; perspectives 
for membership of Ukraine in NATO. As R.Shporlyuk noted: «…in practice all political 
circles in Russia are continuous to question even the fact of existence of Ukrainian nation, 
although some of them prefer not to speak publicly about that due to tactical 
considerations».
51 We think that already existing official statements and actions of Ukrainian, 
Russian politicians and government officials more then enough for analysis of forms of 
Russian-Ukrainian interaction in military and security areas as well as on the distinctive 
features of the bilateral relations of Ukraine with NATO and Russia in the 1990s. 
 
During last decade both American specialists in geopolitics and admirers of the theory 
in Ukraine and Russia had been paying special attention to the place of Ukraine in continental 
politics. Leitmotiv of the discussion was an issue of threat from reemergence on the territory 
of the former USSR of a new union state, which was named a-priori by Z. Brzezinski 
“empire” as well as “European rogue”.
52 Supporters of “the European choice” in Ukraine 
appeared to be in difficult situation. The dream was about creation of collective security 
system in the continent, but it was rather clear that in scenario of deterioration of relations 
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between Moscow and Washington such a system would never be created. In a case of military 
threat for Ukraine, according to A.Gavrilenko, the UN Security Council will not be able to 
make any decision, because of one of the Council members (USA or Russia most probably) 
will use its ‘veto’.
53 Here is the source of persuasion, shared by part of Ukrainian political and 
military elite, that Ukraine is bound to be a buffer zone between NATO, from one side, and 
countries of the Tashkent Treaty, the military union of Russia and Belarus, or simply Russia, 
from other side. 
   
After disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine became the only post-Soviet State, which has 
all key elements of the economy of a modern country. It has well-developed industry, 
included such important branches of industry as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, natural 
resources, energy sector, agriculture, food and textile sectors and many others.
54 
 
With a time-being a tendency appeared in Ukrainian political life, that public opinion 
and electorate in Ukraine treat Russia better compared to attitude to Russia of Ukrainian 
ruling elite. Leonid Kuchma hardly was able to be elected as the President in 1994 and 1999 
without his statements that rapprochement with Russia would be in the center of his foreign 
policy. However, after both Presidential elections both his rhetoric and practical steps 
radically opposed his own statements. Russian leaders soon got used to this reality. In the 
situation of lack of ability to formulate Russian national interests on the post-Soviet territory 
in general and in relations with Ukraine, in particular, Moscow decided to avoid direct 
involvement into the Presidential elections in 1999 in Ukraine. Russian polity in the CIS 
became much more concrete in 2000, when the new Russian President decided to reevaluate 
essence of country’s foreign policy. In the case of Ukraine, new priorities are: recreation of 
previous economic links; reinforcement of positions of Russian capitals in Ukrainian 
economy; reorientation of Ukrainian security policy from NATO back to Russia and even the 
CIS; Ukraine as loyal ally of Russia in such important projects, as the Custom Union, single 
antiballistic missiles defense, etc. Possibility for radical improvement of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations stimulate serious apprehensions among Western foreign policy experts. As Sherman 
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Garnett noted: «Or Ukraine will be the cornerstone of new structure of European security, or 
because of Ukraine all the structure will collapse”
55 
In the CIS Ukraine is on firm second position not just in terms of number of the 
population (about 50 million), but in terms of GDP in general. In the USSR, Ukraine was 
well-known due to its high-tech production. Too optimistic evaluation of the significant 
economic power led in early 1990s Ukrainian political elite to overestimation of attractiveness 
of country for foreign investors and politicians from leading Western states. Ukrainian 
economy itself, as 1990s demonstrated, costs not so much without internal political stability 
and integration into markets of neighbors from the CIS and the biggest internal market in the 
world – single market of the European Union. Few affords of Ukrainian leadership in 
reorientation of national economy into direction of Europe gave very limited outcomes for 
national economy (with exception of metallurgy and chemical industry). Role of Russia in 
foreign economic policy of Ukraine is continuing to be very important. In structure of 
Ukrainian imports about 49% are Russian goods. The role of Russia as part of the CIS is for 
Ukrainian economy even higher: 71% of Ukrainian export to CIS go to Russia, and 79% of 
import – come from Russian Federation.
56 
 
Ukrainian elite reacted very jealously to negotiations of Russia with NATO in late 1996 
– early 1997, which led to signing of The Founding Act in May 1997 in Paris. In 
compensation  NATO decided to establish in the same year 1997 the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission and proclaim the Distinctive Partnership between two sides. NATO and Ukraine 
signed the Charter on Distinctive Partnership at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. This step 
moved the NATO-Ukrainian cooperative relationship to a qualitatively higher level. From his 
side, President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma declared that Ukraine had made a “strategic 
choice of integrating in European and Transatlantic structures”. The Distinctive Partnership 
has opened up new opportunities for practical cooperation and consultation, including the 
highest level. At the same May 1997 Ukraine have signed a “Big Treaty” with Russia – 
“Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership”. For Russian experts, it was a major step 
for Western politics towards current Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma – his mission of 
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establishment of Ukraine as independent and sovereign State was completed for Western 
countries, and they decided to support more pro-western political forces in Kiev.
57 
  
On April 24, 1999 a summit meeting between the leaders of the 19 NATO member 
countries and President Leonid Kuchma was held in Washington. Leaders of NATO countries 
and Ukraine welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the Distinctive 
Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. It opened up new opportunities for practical 
cooperation and consultation in different aspects of both political and military cooperation. A 
NATO Information and Documentation Center, the First such center in a Partner country, has 
been set up in Kiev under a Memorandum of Understanding, signed in May 1997. 
In December 1997 Ukraine and NATO concluded another Memorandum of 
Understanding on civil emergency planning. It provides for cooperation in the field of disaster 
preparedness and other civil emergencies. A third Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
in December 1998 to provide for the posting two NATO liaison officers – one civilian and 
one military – in Kiev.  
 
Ukraine plays a significant role in Partnership for Peace and is engaged in a program of 
PfP activities. In addition, the NATO countries have officially designed the Yavoriv defense 
training area, West of Lviv, as a PfP training center. Simultaneously, Ukraine didn’t cease 
contacts of its military forces with military forces of Russia. But every time Ukraine specially 
underlined that this cooperation is very limited in size, and there was no “anti-Western 
element” in the contacts. For example, during the Fairway of Peace'97 exercise of Ukrainian 
and Russian fleets, initially formed Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the Ukraine’s Defense Minister 
Colonel-General Alexander Kuzmuk repeatedly pointed out that the exercise “should by no 
means be regarded as the start of military cooperation with Russia,”  that it was “of a purely 
peacemaking nature,” and that Ukraine “is a non-bloc State”.
58 
 
One of forms of military cooperation, which Ukraine regards as its priority, is creation 
of several multi-national military units. This policy even got its special term: 
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“batalionotvorchestvo” – creation of battalions.
59 Mostly, Ukraine is creating bilateral and 
multilateral battalions with NATO countries (Poland) or applicant countries (Slovakia, 
Romania). For Moscow it is clear signal of real priorities of Kiev in the field of military 
security and search for allies to improve its security without participation of Russia. In 
addition, in frameworks of Joint working group Ukraine-NATO on issues of military reform 
there are following issues under discussion: expediency of creation of Single Naval Fleet 
based on unification of existing naval fleet of Ukraine and coast guard of the Frontier Guard; 
and “conceptual principles of naval policy of Ukraine in context of further strengthening of 
national security”
60 
 
From the side of NATO there are growing number of signs of respect to this country as 
one of the most important partners of the Alliance in Eastern Europe. On January 27, 2000 the 
Secretary-General of NATO, G.Robertson visited Kiev and had several meetings with leading 
politicians of the country.
61 During the visit to Kiev and Odessa in southern Ukraine he made 
a statement that priorities for the Alliance in Ukraine are: “practical cooperation in military 
and non-military spheres” and “restructuring of defense industry” of Ukraine.
62 
 
For the first time in its history, on March 1-2, 2000 the NATO Council had its session 
on the territory of former USSR – in Kiev, where all 19 Ambassadors to NATO and the 
Secretary-General of the Alliance had been participating.
63 Just on the eve of the session the 
Supreme Rada of Ukraine ratified the SOFA agreement, which defined status of NATO 
troops and legal protection of military units, participating in joint military training in 
frameworks of the “Partnership for Peace”
64 The same agreement determined status of the 
Yavoriv training ground in Western Ukraine as an international training center under aegis of 
NATO. According to Russian media, making comments on the ratified document the 
Secretary-General of NATO said, that the Alliance will finance maintenance of the training 
ground.
65 Most probably, G.Robertson would like to say that resources for the training 
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ground, which is in a very bad condition now, will come from budgets of NATO member-
States. As an official of NATO  said in interview to authors of the report, the budget of 
NATO usually doesn’t foresee such type of spending for countries, which are not member-
States. Moreover, the budget itself is very limited for using its resources for improvement up 
to NATO  standards of the Ukrainian training field. Another sensitive topic for Russia, which 
was discussed during visits of the Secretary-General and the NATO Council to Ukraine is the 
opportunity for NATO to utilize just ratified Treaty on Open Sky for observation flights over 
territory of Ukraine, which, of course, include flights over Russian Naval base in Sebastopol; 
participation of NATO in elaboration and implementation of military reform in Ukraine. 
According to point of view of a Western expert, describing symbolic significance of Kiev’s 
NAC meeting:  ”With this gathering, it appears that the alliance (NATO) is sending two sharp 
messages: one of support to Kiev and one of warning to Moscow.”
66 On March 7, 2000, soon 
after the session of NATO Council in Kiev the Press-Secretary of Ukrainian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Igor Grushko stated, that “Ukraine under certain conditions may submit to 
the North-Atlantic Alliance its request for membership”.
67 For Russia it was too much! 
Moscow was ready to construct bilateral relations with Kiev taking into account mutual 
interests, but it was totally unacceptable to be a creditor and a guarantee of economic stability 
for a country, which is planning to join a military alliance, which Russia sees as threat to its 
national security. We think, that since that statement it is possible to define another period of 
history of bilateral relations. Previous period, which began in May 1997, when the “Big 
Treaty” between Ukraine and Russia was signed, was not very fruitful for both Ukraine and 
Russia, but there were no large-scale conflicts and the two countries started to accommodate 
themselves with the new reality – Ukrainian and Russian sovereignty. Since the statement of 
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many elements of Russian behavior have changed and 
Moscow was able to demonstrate that it has enough tools to influence policy of Kiev in the 
international arena in general and towards “the NATO factor” in particular. 
 
Formation of the GUUAM and active role of Ukraine in the organization were 
unpleasant surprise for Moscow. Russian politicians and military reasonably decided, that 
creation of the organization will cut some opportunities for influence on all five countries, and 
first of all – on Ukraine. Formation of the GUUAM and departure of some members of the 
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Tashkent Treaty from Russian-led military alliance have demonstrated intention of several 
newly independent States to undermine domination of Russia in the former USSR area. First 
anxiety of Moscow was related to perspective of enlargement of cooperation between a 
number of CIS countries and NATO in frameworks of the Partnership for Peace Program. It is 
quite evidently, that Russia practically from the start of the program was reacting negatively 
and suspiciously. Under unfavorable for Moscow scenario, the situation is possible when the 
PfP program will be starting point for spreading of NATO influence on the Former USSR’s 
territory – such scenario have been foreseen by several Russian diplomats, whose agreed to 
answer our questions. The same idea is very popular in Russian media. 
 
We didn’t find facts of official contacts between NATO and leaders of five GUUAM 
countries. There is an impression, that NATO simply doesn’t notice even existence of 
GUUAM because of its amorphous structure as well as striking even for the post-Soviet 
countries instability in member-States of the organization.  Indeed, Ukraine didn’t become a 
stable country even after its economy began its boom in 2000; in Moldova Communists-led 
opposition came to power in early spring 2001 with idea of joining the Union of Russia and 
Belarus as full member. Regimes in Georgia and Azerbaijan may hardly be designated 
“stable” and democratic by any sort of evaluation. Authoritarian features are dominating in 
political system of Uzbekistan. From point of view of authors, NATO is unlikely take the risk 
of making GUUAM its partner in the post-Soviet system. Most likely, the Alliance wait for 
final collapse of the project. There is a clear conflict of interests between GUUAM as 
organization, oriented on prevention of Russian control of energy (oil and, maybe natural gas) 
supply from the Caspian Sea to European markets, and GUUAM as an instrument of 
cooperation of member-States in the spheres of security and defense. However, after 
statements of Russian officials in early 2001, that Moscow is not concerned in integration in 
the CIS and ready for multi-speed integration (or lack of any integration), GUUAM as 
mechanism of pressure on Russia simply became out-of-date. The policy of Ukraine in early 
2001 demonstrated this shift very clearly. Now Kiev prefers tranquil dialog with Russia to 
conflict, especially when under discussion are issues of keeping Russian market open for 
Ukrainian goods or when the topic of negotiations is the huge Ukrainian debt for supply of 
Russian natural gas. NATO factor, which was dominant in relations of Ukraine and Russia, 
which was in the beginning of Boris Tarasyuk’s term as the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
among the most important for Russian-Ukrainian relations, ceased to be an independent value 
for bilateral relations now and is just a combination of interest of such countries, as the USA,   44 
Germany, France, etc. The President L.Kuchma have dismissed B.Tarasyuk at the moment, 
when he understood that. Symbolically, he did it at the same day (September 29, 2000), when 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine express its protest to diplomatic representatives of 
USA and Canada against their interference into internal affairs of Ukraine.
68 Soon after that 
L.Kuchma stated: “There is no alternative to strategic relations with Russia at the moment (for 
Ukraine) – nobody is waiting Ukraine in Europe”.
69 
 
It is too early to say that current rapprochement of Russia and Ukraine is a long-term 
tendency. Majority of Ukrainian specialists, who agreed to give us interviews in Kiev 
(February 2000) and Yalta (May 2000) have confirmed the importance of Russian factor in 
security policy of Ukraine. But much more time during our interviews had been spent for 
analysis of Ukraine’s relations with NATO. There is a consensus in Ukraine that there is no 
possibilities for Ukraine to be a NATO member in a near future due to internal instability as 
well as very small chances for full-scale cooperation between Kiev and Brussels. This 
cooperation should take form not only grants of military equipment or simply transfer of 
financial resources. The essence of NATO-Ukraine cooperation should be in military reform 
according to standards of NATO. The military expenditures of Ukraine for that should be 
many times more then now, but Ukraine is not able to do that. If any direction would be taken 
from the current policy of Ukraine as a non-block country, this  direction is NATO or military 
structures of the European Union. These ideas were dominant in Ukraine just one year ago. 
Since that time both situation and public opinion had changed in a radical way because of 
change of Russian politics towards Ukraine in a year 2000 and activity of Russian diplomacy 
in the country.  
 
During one year after inauguration of Vladimir Putin as the President of Russia, totally 
new themes are now in dialog among Moscow and Kiev, which were never existed before 
2000.  For example, Russia is asking for getting property rights on tens objects of military 
infrastructure, which have been built in Sebastopol during previous 10 years.
70 Russian and 
Ukrainian military are discussing mechanisms informing each other about visits of foreign 
warships to Crimea. More and more concrete is discussion on creation of joint Russian-
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Ukrainian squadron in Black Sea.
71 During his visit to Kiev in January 2001 when Minister of 
Defense of Russia, Igor Sergeev, according to information of The Kommersant-Daily, signed 
an agreement with his Ukrainian colleague on participation of Russian military experts in 
planning of multinational training exercises on the Ukrainian territory.
72 
 
The visit of President Putin to Dnepropetrovsk on Februaty 11-12, 2001 became one of 
the most risky undertakings in his short presidential career. Large-scale demonstrations in 
Kiev, directed against the President Leonid Kuchma and his Administration created 
background of the visit. The world media at that time lively discussed chances for L.Kuchma 
to keep his post. That’s why visit of Putin became a symbol of Russia’s support of existing 
Ukrainian leadership. In exchange to that President Putin was able to formulate new economic 
and political priorities of Russia towards second-biggest CIS country. Officially, the 
Dnepropetrovsk talks were about bilateral economic relations. In fact, however, the 
invigoration of top-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine was essentially geopolitical.
73 
It is hard to overestimate the potential gains for Russia, if the unified industrial and energy 
complex of the former USSR, which used to be based on the territories of the RFSFR and the 
Ukrainian SSR, will be recreated. This movement will destabilize strategic situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe and sharply improve Russian position in the post-Soviet area. 
 
Enlargement of forms and means of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in 2000-
2001 allowed all countries of the Black Sea region to make significant step towards military 
cooperation in the region. On April 2
nd, 2001 in Istanbul, officials of six countries of the 
region (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine) have signed an agreement 
on establishment of Black Sea naval group of operational interaction - (Blackseafor).
74 The 
purpose of the Blackseafor – rescue and peacekeeping operations, immediate assistance to 
countries of the region in a case of emergency, cleaning of the Black Sea from mines, as well 
as visits of the Good will.
75 Such initiative, which is modest by any estimation, demonstrated 
new quality of regional cooperation with growing feeling of trust and wish to assist neighbors. 
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The important element of the plan is involvement in the project of Turkey – a member of 
NATO and countries, who are seeking membership of the Alliance in a near future.  
 
2) Moldova 
 
For several years after the military conflict between Kishinev (Chisinau) and Tiraspol in 
Transdnistria (1992), Moldova attracted minimal attention of Moscow. Partly it can be 
explained by difficulties in settlement of interethnic conflict in Moldova itself. But in practice, 
the interethnic problems were not the only one. For Moscow the issue of preserving troops in 
the region, influence of organized crime in Tiraspol as well as unclear position of Kiev 
towards situation in Transdnistria were complicated the process of elaboration of strategy 
towards Moldova.  
  
Period of uncertainty in Transdnistrian’s policy of Russia was too long. To some extent,  
it can be explained by activity of general Alexander Lebed, maverick Russian general with 
big political ambitions, who was the Commander of Russian troops up to 1996. He was 
portrayed by Russian media as the guarantor of stability in Transdnistria. The formula of the 
stability has never been officially presented by the Kremlin, but it was very clear that major 
elements of the formula were: territorial integrity of Kishinev (Chisinau) over all territory of 
the country; and keeping uncertainty over real control of Kishinev (Chisinau) over the most 
economically developed part of the country without real search for solution of the problem. 
Most probably, the situation in Moldova was just a part of bilateral relations with Ukraine. 
Kiev and Moscow were able to cooperate in the peace process, but with Moscow’s abstention 
Ukraine had a zone of instability on its western border, which potentially could turn into real 
conflict, dangerous for both Moldova and Ukraine. This uncertainty was beneficial for Russia, 
which was forced to remove its troops from Transdnistria after signing of the Conventional 
Forces Treaty, and Russia did it even ahead of original schedule.
76 
 
Activation of Russian politics in Moldova and Transdnistria began in 2000, when the 
Kremlin decided to modernize its policy in the CIS and make it more dynamic. Tradition of 
joint military exercises of Russia and Moldova returned. For example, in August 7-12, 2000 
the peace-keeping training ‘The Blue shield – 2000” was organized at the Bulboaka training 
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ground, where about 40 Russian military servicemen took part.
77 It is important to emphasize, 
that observers from Transdnistria also took part in the exercises.  
  
The State Commission on assistance in political settlement of the Transdnistrian 
problem was established in Russia. Yevgeniy Primakov, former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the Prime-Minister of Russia in 1998-1999 became the Head of the Commission. In early 
2001 the Commission prepared a draft of the Agreement on foundations of interrelations 
between Moldova and Transdnistria. Another document, suggested by the Commission, was 
“The basic principles of Mandate of Forces for maintenance of peace and stability in the 
Transdnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”
78 These and some other drafts of 
Commission’s documents leaked to Russian newspapers and became an object of severe 
criticism.  Primakov was accused as “… the principal designer of consecutive “surrender” of 
Russian interests” not just in Transdnistria, but in whole Europe, or at least in the European 
part of the CIS.
79 As a result, the functioning of the Commission was blocked and President 
Putin with his Presidential Administration became key players in the region.  
  
Soon after publication of results of Parliamentary elections in Moldova in February 
2001, the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko supported an idea of admitting 
Moldova into the Belarus-Russia Union. Vladimir Voronin, the leader of the Moldavian 
Communist party, which won 49% of the votes and 71 of the 101 parliamentary seats, ran a 
campaign calling for integration into the Belarus-Russia Union and establishment of Russian 
as a second official language.
80 Probably, major interest of Russia in Moldova is related to 
security concerns as well as opportunities to have better starting positions for all types of 
negotiations with Ukraine. In fact, Russia is very much concerned in securing an opportunity 
to have troops in Moldova as mechanism for influence on Moldavian foreign policy. Strong 
positions in Kishinev (Chisinau) may give Moscow better opportunities for controlling 
Ukrainian foreign policy. Without Moldova in GUUAM, the geopolitical essence of this 
block is disappearing immediately. If Moldova will establish good relations with Russia, 
proponents of Russia-Belarus-Ukraine Union in Kiev obtain very influential arguments for 
this union.  
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Significantly enough, Putin, whose skepticism towards the integration in the CIS is 
well-known, made special statement on possibility of Moldova to join the Union of Russia 
and Belarus in his Internet press-conference on March 6, 2001, immediately after the 
Parliamentary elections in Moldova, when Communists establish their control over the 
Parliament of Moldova and office of President of the country. The only obstacles for Russian 
President were “…need to follow internal procedures in Moldova for that”
81 During the first 
official visit of the newly elected President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin to Moscow in mid-
April 2001, avoided even a single mentioning of NATO as an important factor for European 
security. He preferred to discuss other problems: possibilities of integration of Moldova into 
the European Union, the Union of Russia and Belarus, the Euro-Asian Economic Community; 
the Transdnistrian issue; signing of the Basic Treaty between Russia and Moldova.
82 In the 
case of Transdnistria new position of Moldova is favorable for Russia: rejection of 
“internationalization” of the conflict via permission of the OSCE observers to come into the 
region. It means that he is ready to negotiate for rather long time and accept Russia as the 
principle side in the mediation of the conflict.
83 For Georgiy Tikhonov, a member of Russia 
State Duma, the message of the President of Moldova has to be understood as full-scale 
participation of Russian troops in the region as the key guarantor of stability in the situation 
when Romania is applying for NATO membership,
84 and in the near future NATO’s 
infrastructure will be on the borders of Moldova. Probably, this “apocalyptic” scenario was 
reported to the Presidential Administration of Russia and reaction there was very negative. As 
a result, Russia in spring 2001 demonstrated its interest in Moldova and Transdnistria, and 
made several effective steps towards reinforcement of its role in the region as the only 
powerful guarantor of stability.  
  
The results of Presidential elections in Ukraine in 1994 and 1999, and in Moldova in 
2001, testified that only a politician, who is supported an idea of close cooperation and some 
forms of unification with Russia has a chances to be elected as President in both Moldova and 
Ukraine. That’s why opportunities for interaction of Ukraine and Moldova with NATO are 
becoming more limited. In principle, the Alliance will be able to cooperate with both 
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countries in a very limited way in a near future. Among possible forms of cooperation: 
consulting on ways of implementation of military reform (with very limited financial 
resources); defining forms of interaction between military people and civilians; joint exercises 
with “unmilitary scenarios” – peacekeeping, rescue operations, natural disasters. Strictly 
speaking, these forms were officially declared as purposes of cooperation of NATO with 
Ukraine. Moscow is looking for many years if there is something “more” in NATO-Ukrainian 
relations. Many of our interviews led us to conclusion that the most probably, there is nothing 
“more” And, in fact, NATO factor in Moldova and especially in Ukraine’s politics is limited 
to unclear idea of “cooperation with the West”, and influence of NATO in political life of 
Ukraine is limited by small group of pro-western politicians, journalists and scholars.  
 
As events of April 2001 (dismissal of Prime-Minister Viktor Yuschenko and anti-
presidential demonstrations in Kiev and many major cities of Ukraine) have perfectly 
demonstrated, split of Ukrainian elite, started in early 1990s, is continuing to be significant 
and even becoming more dangerous. The major dividing-line of the split concerns the 
geopolitical orientation of the country:  the search for a place of Ukraine in community of 
western democracies or in new post-Soviet area, where it is one obvious leader – new 
Russia.
85 
 
Like NATO and even more then NATO, Russia has many cards to play with Ukraine. 
Ukraine’s Russian minority composes more then a quarter of the Ukrainian population. 
Russian military and security services retain strong presence in Kiev.
86 According to a 
Western expert: “In case of a conflict, no one in Kiev truly knows who would rally behind the 
(Ukrainian) flag”.
87 And despite the size of Ukrainian territory and its multimillion 
population, it still shares a long and nearly indefensible border with the Soviet Union’s most 
powerful successor state: Russia. 
 
Strategic purpose of Moscow in relations with Ukraine and Moldova should be 
economic cooperation, settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict, establishment of Russian 
private companies in the most attractive sectors of Ukrainian economy and creation of good 
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conditions for investments into Ukraine of Russian capitals. Consequently, relations of both 
Russia and its western neighbors will be more civilized, and only in that situation Russia’s 
natural advantageous will be demonstrated for both political elite and business communities: 
geographical proximity, higher level of openness of internal Russian market compared to the 
EU; readiness to be equal partner in negotiations on any issue of bilateral and multilateral 
relations. For many years, the most important conditions for improvement and development 
of bilateral relations, especially with Ukraine, was the political and economic stability in 
Russia. Now this condition doesn’t seem totally unreal.   51 
7. Caucasus: geopolitics, oil and religion.  
“Geography should make the Caucasus rich and 
happy. History and politics make it poor and 
miserable”.
88 
 
The Economist. 
 
In  the 90s the Caucasus, previously remaining in shadow, turned out to be one of the 
hottest Eurasian regions. This has resulted from discovery of new oil- and gas-fields, problem 
of  Caspian oil-transportation, numerous territorial and ethnic conflicts. There are more than 
3000 kilometres of international borders in the Caucasus. Only the smallest - the 9 km - 
stretch between Azerbaijan and Turkey is really peaceful. All other borders have already been 
violated (between Azerbaijan and Armenia) or marked the situation of potential conflict, may 
be not necessary military (border of Russia and Georgia, or Georgia and Armenia). 
 
The United States recognised the Southern Caucasus as the zone of its concern and 
declared that it "principally opposed any idea of creating spheres of interests in the post-
Soviet area and would stick to this idea in the future".
89  Actually, this means reluctance of the 
United States to acknowledge special interests of Russia in this region and let the former 
interfere into the policies - foreign as well as internal - of the Caucasian countries affecting 
their choosing of partners on the world scene.  As it has been noted by professor Vladimir 
Degoev, Russia considers that "the area bordering with Russia in the North, Iran and Turkey 
in the South is  - according to situation - might play as a buffer, or a competitive ground, or a 
constructive link between them".
90 A perspective of Caucasian countries' joining military 
alliances directly or indirectly designed against Russia is "justly considered in Kremlin as a 
threat".
91 At the same time, analysis of the US foreign policy gives a reason to a number of 
specialists to characterise the Moscow and Washington policies as utterly alternative.
92 
 
During the second half of 90s Azerbaijan and Georgia disappointed by CIS peace-
keeping abilities actively welcomed US and NATO interest for the Southern Caucasus based 
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on its strategic importance for NATO-members in terms of energy resources. As Russian 
experts have noted, "The loss of Transcaucasus left Russian South naked in geopolitical sense 
with its security undermined and the very state more vulnerable. Azerbaijan is blackmailing 
Russia by a threat of stationing a NATO military base on its territory... Georgia is trying as 
well not lose opportunity of a blackmailing in a similar fashion... Armenia, though having 
become a strategic partner of Russia, is not against playing "NATO tricks too".
93 It can be 
observed that the very fact of maintaining contacts with NATO is viewed by Moscow 
"geopolitics" as a kind of stigma on a country's reputation. Relations with NATO are 
obviously treated not as a real threat but as a blackmail not deserving reaction. 
 
However, reaction  - rather sharp - always took place in fact. For example, on July 10, 
1998, the Head of the Central Administration of International Co-operation of the Russian 
Ministry of Defence colonel-general Leonid Ivashov has flayed NATO plans to strengthen 
military pillar of the alliance's Southern flank, calling the situation in Transcaucasus   
"alarming and dangerous".
94 
 
Steady interest of Turkey to the NATO presence in the Caucasus has been confirmed in 
Autumn 2000 by the decision to establish a head-quarter of the alliance's rapid-reaction force 
having the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle Asia within its zone of responsibility.
95 
These force should consist of some 1500 officers and play a role of a deterring factor for 
extremists acting in the region. 
 
Strategically located on the western coast of the Caspian Sea and heir to an ancient 
civilisation and Soviet industrialisation, Azerbaijan preceded other former Soviet republics in 
declaring its independence from the USSR.
96 In the recent decade the country underwent 
drastic shifts in its internal and external policies, stabilising somehow only under leadership 
of  the former higher communist  Geidar Aliev who has taken power in 1993.  
Hopes for economic prosperity based on the great oil and gas reserves appeared to be 
overestimated. Vague judicial status of the Caspian Sea and zones it is to be divided between 
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coastal countries complicates the situation even further. About 2-3 million Azerbaijanis reside 
in Russia, earning money to support their relatives left in the home-country.
 97 Thus, Russia 
plays an important role for Azerbaijan (the government of the latter previously preferred to 
overlook this fact).  Preserving connections between people in Russia and Azerbaijan is one 
of the crucial thing for its policy affecting not only Baku economy but defence priorities as 
well.
98 
 
Baku intends to decrease its traditional dependence on Russia. In this regard, Azerbaijan 
has established cordial, co-operative and close relations with Ankara. Especially it is 
noticeable in the military sphere where Turkey has become its main partner during exercises, 
with Azerbaijani officers training in Turkish schools and about 70 Turkish military instructors 
working in Azerbaijani army.
99  The major challenge to Azerbaijan is territorial integrity, that 
is why Baku intends to strengthen base both economically and militarily in such a fashion that 
could regain the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia. 
 
In his book “The Grand Chessboard” Zbigniew Brzezinski identifies Azerbaijan as a 
pivot State in the Caucasus (Brzezinski 1997), a State of particular geopolitical significance. It 
is important to mention that Azerbaijan is the only Caspian littoral State that is a member of 
GUUAM, which include also Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova. Although this 
organisation does not claim to be anti-Russian or anti-Commonwealth of Independent States, 
it is a group which seeks to establish new ties and to develop transport connection. The 
primary technical aim of the GUUAM is to open access to Caspian oil to Central and East 
European markets. But more strategic aim for at least Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine is to 
move out of Russian influence and dependence on Russian transit links. That is why 
Azerbaijan as the key oil-exploring country in the region is the most important member of the 
GUUAM and main opponent for Russia’s attempts to build new transport infrastructure 
following old Soviet routes. 
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The highest yet level of Azerbaijan's interest in a NATO-membership took place in the 
Autumn of 1999 and the beginning of 2000.
 100 The following explanations might be admitted. 
First, the new military campaign which started in August, 1999, threatening with new 
complications for Russia. Second, a certain fear of transferring military actions onto 
Azerbaijani territory, this might be prevented - as Baku considered - only with NATO help. 
Third, shift of leadership in Kremlin, with a young and pragmatically thinking president 
coming forth as a partner in talks with authoritarian and even totalitarian CIS leaders, Geidar 
Aliev as their real patriarch possibly proved to be most stung. 
 
Even before the visit of Geidar Aliev to the United States took place (the eve of 2000), 
Azerbaijan offered NATO leadership its plan of establishing in Baku a regional information 
centre, i.e. covered with its activities the three Caucasian States.
101 Work practice of such 
centres displays not only day-by-day information about the Alliance's current issues and 
statements but spreading freedom, human rights and democratic relations between militaries 
and society as well. It was only in the beginning of 2001 that the USA dared to characterise 
the Azerbaijani political regime as "clannish and corrupted", mentioning "violations of human 
rights and free press persecution".
102  These facts were well known in Russia but such 
"double-standards" of USA in terms of Azerbaijan turned out to be unexpected. 
 
It has been appraised in Azerbaijan that the first visit in the new millennium the 
President of Russia paid to this country, having stepped aside of Russian diplomatic 
stereotypes which, as a ritual, usually gave Armenia a first turn.
103 The warm atmosphere of  
the visit signalled the other world that Russian and Azerbaijani interests in the region are not 
that opposite to consider the policy of the former a priori pro-NATO and anti-Russian.  It has 
also been confirmed in the "Baku  Declaration on the Principles for Provision of Security and 
Co-operation Development in the Caucasus". Soon experts started discussing a possibility of 
resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or even establishing the strategic Moscow-Baku-
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Tehran axis.
104 However Russia is much more interested in securing its control over the 
Gabala Early Warning Radar Station which has entered into service in 1985, becoming one of 
the main element of the radar system and covering the whole space of the Middle East and 
Persian Gulf. Its future yet is under discussion. 
 
Armenian course of  foreign policy suffered different jerks in the 90s and can not be 
characterised as ultimately shaped. The country's co-operation with NATO is limited enough. 
This is the result, above all, of  intensive military contacts with Russia. They were reflected in 
the text of  the "Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation" signed in Moscow (August 29, 1997) 
which contains a paragraph concerning mutual guarantees in case of armed conflict with 
participation of one of the parties.
105 In addition to the military assistance, Russia maintains a 
base in Armenia with a 4000-personnel.
106  For years military co-operation with Russia was a 
guarantor of Armenian sovereignty. During the visit of the President Kocharyan to Moscow in 
September, 2000, Russia and Armenia signed the "Declaration on the Allied Co-operation 
between the Russian Federation and Republic Armenia for the 21
st Century"
107 It has created 
new standard for bilateral relations between Russia and its closest CIS partners, a special 
attention being paid to the Treaty on Collective Security.  
 
Armenia has common border with one of NATO-members - Turkey, but relations 
between those two states are traditionally cold. Even more tough are relations with another 
neighbour -  Azerbaijan. The war in the first half of the 90s exhausted both countries. It 
should be noted that the existing political regime in Armenia is one of the most democratic 
ones if compared with that of Azerbaijan or Iran where authoritarian forms of rule are 
predominating. An idea of co-operation with Russia constantly gains popularity among 
Armenian political elite and the population of the country in the whole. But an attitude to 
bilateral problem settling with Azerbaijan, in contrast, is distinctly negative. As Geidar Aliev 
once suggested, the assassination of the Armenian prime-minister and speaker of the 
Parliament in October, 1999 gave benefits only to opponents of normalisation of Armenian-
Azerbaijani relations.
108 
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This was acknowledged by NATO as well. When visiting Transcaucasian States, NATO 
General-Secretary George Robertson admitted that Armenia will not be invited to join the 
Alliance, giving it opportunities only within the framework of the "Partnership For Peace" 
programme.
109 
  
After withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia, Armenia remained the only country 
where the Russian Transcaucasian Forces (RTF) can be stationed. According the agreement 
signed in 1995 RTF in Georgia should be removed by the Summer of 2001.
 110 Thus, in 
November, 1995 Russia has faced an unpleasant surprise when President Kocharyan of   
Armenia and President Aliev of Azerbaijan in their statements both supported an idea of a 
new Pact for Security of the Southern Caucasus region. This idea envisaged withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Armenia and significant improvement of its relations with Turkey.
111  
 
Currently, there are about 2800 servicemen in the Russian Transcaucasian Forces in 
Armenia. According to the Treaty of 1997 they "together with the armed forces of Armenia 
guarantee security of the Republic Armenia on the on the outer borders of the former 
USSR"
112 In case of the total removing of Russian forces from their Georgian bases (Gudauta, 
Vaziani, Akhalkalaki, Batumi) some 5000 militaries might be added to the army group in 
Armenia with a significant grow of quality owing to the better equipment. 
  
Relations between Russian and Armenian military officers are intensive as well. Their 
character might be described by the issues discussed during the visit of the delegation of the 
Russian General Staff to Yerevan in March, 2001. Among them were creation of the joint 
Russian-Armenian force on the territory of Armenia, joint air patrolling, operation planning, 
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co-operation in the spheres of air forces organisation, communication, logistics and 
armament.
113 
 
Georgia more than other CIS countries succeeded in exploitation of the "Russian threat" 
in its relations with NATO and the United States. The latter pays much attention to it since 
Eduard Shevardnadze has become Georgian President. During the last decade the United 
States rendered in assistance for Georgia as much as $1 billion.. In 2001 financial support is 
expected to amount $91  million.
114 
 
Having a trifling military budget, Georgia, nevertheless officially declared its claim to 
adopt its air-defence system to NATO requirements. Tbilisi is planning to put at alliance's 
disposal air-bases, military training grounds and its Black Sea ports as well as some military 
units for participation in peace-keeping operations.
115 
 
Being interested in Russian energy supplies and other strategic goods, Georgia does not 
risk to endanger its relations with Russia too much.
116 As Georgian Ambassador to Russia 
Zurab Abashidze once stated, "Russia should not worry about NATO expansion, for it will 
not concern Georgia".
117 
 
About one tenth of the 5 million Georgian population live in Russia for here they have 
an opportunity to find a job to keep their families. Many Georgians obtain Russian citizenship 
and move to Russia.
118 
 
Georgia tries to manoeuvre between the two poles of its foreign policy - US and Russia 
- to get advantages from both. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgi Burduli was candid 
enough in his speech: "It is important for Shevardnadze that the US should support Georgia 
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facing Russian menace. We need  this pressure upon Russia; without it the possibility to 
change situation will be also absent".
119 
  
In December 1998 during the EAPC meeting the Minister of Defence of Georgia, David 
Tevzadze, made clear statement, that Georgia prefer internationalisation of conflicts on its 
own territory better then continuing involvement of Russia: “NATO/EAPC should further 
focus their attention on all existing conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic space – there are no first and 
second class conflicts. Consultation on regional issues should also be reinforced”.
120 
  
Kremlin reacted painfully.
121 On the one hand the main course of the Russian policy 
since Boris Yeltsin entered his post was an anti-imperialist nature of the new Russia and 
rejection of the Soviet legacy, on the other - Russia had to prepare itself for the possible 
joining of some former USSR members to NATO. Thus reaction on the wish of Georgia to 
take part in NATO could be a kind of the first defensive line in the future political fight 
against the Alliance's expansion. 
 
Western countries were, in their turn, distressed by the possibilities of co-operation in 
the military sphere, in  January 2000 uneasily watching negotiations between the two States 
on the matter of the joint border patrolling in the sector adjoining to Chechen Republic. When 
on January 22
nd, 2000, the Russian and Georgian interior ministers announced the launching 
of such patrols, it immediately became one of the major international news. The U.S. 
analytical company STRATFOR evaluated it in a rather radical manner: “If true, this marks a 
collapse in Georgian government policy and establishes a new Russian military presence in 
Georgia. The West must react quickly, or Russian policies will further erode Georgian 
independence”.
122 As it became clear in the nearest future, it was misunderstanding in 
interpretation of bilateral discussions, but sharp reaction in the West clearly demonstrates 
importance of lack of Russian-Georgian co-operation for defending Western interests in the 
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region. The STRATFOR also formulate rather difficult option for Georgian leadership: “The 
only way Georgia can be prevented from falling back into Russia’s orbit is if Turkey 
establishes a military presence in Georgia – something that becomes less likely with every 
passing day”.
123 
 
The constructive position of Russia on the future of its military bases in Georgia has 
become the important feature of the Russian policy. The decision to close them has been 
adopted by both States on November 17, 1999 during the Istanbul OSCE summit.
124 
According to the agreements followed in 2000, Russia will transform its base in Abkhazia 
(Gudauta) into rehabilitation centre for its peace-keepers;
125 the military airport at Vaziani 
will be operated until Russian forces remain in Georgia.
126 
  
One may easily presume that in the nearest future manoeuvring of Georgia between 
Russia and USA-NATO will continue. Thus, on the eve of George Robertsons's visit 
(September 25-27, 2000) to Tbilisi, President Shevardnadze characterised relations between 
NATO and Georgia as a "partnership", but soon mentioned that "Georgia and NATO are 
interested developing good relations with all the countries, Russia first"
127  Such a policy 
offers Georgian leadership a possibility to avoid dramatic changes in the internal issues. 
Finally, Moscow could believe that it is the Russian influence that made Tbilisi make 
concessions and decline an idea of joining NATO.
128 It might be not an absolute accident that 
in the beginning of 2001 the neutral status of Georgia has been talked over in Tbilisi. As 
N.Broladze noted, "Leading politicians believe neutrality to be an optimal way for Georgia 
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because of its geopolitical location".
129 At the same time Georgia will keep its chance to 
blackmail Russia with an idea of quitting CIS.
130  
 
Invention of visa regime by Russia pursued the political aim of making Georgia 
undertake adequate measures against groupings of Chechen terrorists on its territory. It was as 
early as in Autumn of 1999 that Russia requested permission for a military actions to force 
them out of Pankisi ravine because Georgian army lacked capabilities to do so.
131  
 
Georgian President preferred, instead, deterioration of relations with Moscow. But the 
experience displayed that Russia after this step and after turning Chechen conflict into a low-
intensity form has only broadened its possibilities. First of all, it concerns the support of  
Russia in Southern Osetia and Abkhazia, where Georgian position is traditionally weak.
132 
Scale of support from Western states in this matter has also been overestimated by Georgia.
133 
  
Today the West is ready to criticise Russian policy in the Caucasus, but serious 
diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions or any other actions of such kind are obviously not 
planned. If this case the weight of settling multiple conflicts in this region will fall onto its 
shoulders. Stationing forces to keep stability here is practically unavoidable. The Georgian 
ruling elite required a certain time to realise it. Only in February, 2001 President 
Shevardnadze made a sudden statement which marked changing of his previously rigid 
position. The message implied unwillingness of Georgia to do any  quick steps with a neutral 
status as the most possible perspective for its external policy.
134 
 
GUUAM is an additional way for Georgia to play its own game. Georgia, from the 
position of economic perspectives, must be the most interested party here. It is stuck to the 
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only perspective pipeline route Baku-Jeikhan (previously Baku-Supsa)
135 and the transport 
passage TRASECA.
136 Thus, Georgian diplomatic circles were very active when preparing 
CIS summit in Kiev in March, 2001
137, its cancellation being a heavy failure for Tbilisi.  
 
With the "Caucasian knot" getting more and more tight, different States have different 
stakes in the "big game". For three of them it is a question of existence and opportunity to 
keep territories and unexpectedly obtained sovereignty. Russia is aiming at securing the 
Soviet heritage, though this very fact is contested almost by each of its regional opponents as 
well as by the world powers. Resting upon interventionism these powers, Vladimir Degoev 
keenly noted,  " have pretensions for something they can not yet have".
138 Russian policy has 
become much more active since August, 1999 when substantial military forces were used to 
wipe out Chechen terrorists invading Dagestan. Serious diplomatic steps followed in the very 
Caucasian direction and in terms of the bordering States. It was in February, 2000, that an 
expert of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" pointed to the fact of "general stirring up of the Moscow 
policy in the Caucasus" and one of the Western diplomats working in Yerevan admitted that 
"Russia remained a decisive force in the region, capable of  bringing perceptible corrections 
into development of situation in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia".
139 
 
Elaborating and implementing its own policy in the Caucasus, Russia is interested in 
protecting its territorial integrity by responding effectively to any regional warfare, such as 
Chechnya. This goal is so significant for Moscow, that Putin and his team in Kremlin have 
not worried about Western countries’ criticism of Russian anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya 
since 1999. Russian leaders have reminded the West that Russia still remains to be one of the 
two main global nuclear powers, which aims to protect its territory and does not allow 
international interference in what it considers to be a domestic issue. But the Second War in 
Chechnya, especially in its initial stage in autumn 1999, demonstrated to Kremlin that such a 
conflict could spill over to the rest of the region – not just to Dagestan, but even to Georgia 
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and Azerbaijan. Russia wants to make sure that other States in the Caucasus, particularly 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, would not pose a direct or indirect threat to Russian territorial 
integrity by assisting the terrorists.   63 
8.  Central Asia – far off NATO, close to Russia and Afghanistan 
 
Republics of the Central Asian part of the USSR found themselves after 1991 in a very 
hard situation, which is still the same even after 10 years of independence. Firstly, 
independence was totally unexpected for them. Although in the times of the USSR feudal 
traditions continued to exist in these Soviet republics, but persistent policy of Moscow, not 
just repressive, but also educational, brought into the region radical changes, which 
transformed Central Asia into more modern and developed from social-economic point of 
view. Secondly, newly independent countries of Central Asia didn’t have enough experience 
for dealing with challenges of regional and world politics without assistance from Moscow. 
That’s why in early 1990s five sovereign States of Central Asia had used quite successfully 
contacts with Moscow for moving into their new status smoothly. It is obvious, that stake on 
Moscow in many occasions was wrong or failed to be really effective. Partly it can be 
explained by severe crisis in Russia itself. But even more important was the fact, that Russia 
was trying to choose its new strategic partners and define its zone of influence in geopolitical 
terms. Moscow easily proclaimed as its the most important strategic partners Belarus, Ukraine 
and Armenia. Attitude of Moscow to republics of Central Asia was a bit different. Most 
probably, it was a belief in Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that newly 
independent countries of the region are so dependent on Moscow that they have no free 
choice. That’s why Moscow demonstrated its interest to the region, but the interest was not 
really big one. Supporting this opinion, Central Asian countries became members of the CIS 
and practically all of them – members of the Collective Security Treaty. It looks like Moscow 
was quite happy that Turkmenistan, which has the longest border with Afghanistan, decided 
to keep distance from “integration nuclear” and using rhetoric about “returning back to 
traditions of previous generations” started its transformation into a despotic State. In general, 
before the Taliban Movement appeared as the powerful force in Afghanistan, Russia’s interest 
to Central Asia was modest. The only exception was interest in huge oil and natural gas 
resources of those countries of the region, which are around Caspian Sea (Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, and to some extent – Uzbekistan). The main purpose of Russia’s policy here was 
to create barriers for Central Asian oil and gas on the way to world markets, or to force 
countries of the region to use Russian oil and gas pipe-lines for transit of energy resources to 
Europe through Russian territory. Moscow has got quite limited results in this sphere, but it is 
quite clear, that Kremlin had no need to use military force for solving problems of transit in 
favorable way or to use for that cooperation in the military sphere. The Tashkent Treaty was   64 
designed for demonstration Russia’s key role in providing military security in the region and 
dominant position in the reintegration processes, if they one day become a reality. 
 
But since mid-1990s Moscow had understood, that radical changes transformed the 
region. For our research two aspects are the most important: 1) the process of State formation 
have been completed in the region, that’s why there were no chances that domination of 
Moscow (if ever existed) will be guaranteed in future; 2) the reaction of Central Asian States 
on threat from Afghanistan was different, that’s why Moscow have to work out five different 
policies in the region instead of one policy, which would be able to create joint opposition to 
threat of Taliban Movement. Since late 1990s there were no illusions in Moscow that any of 
the newly independent states of Central Asia was going to keep “special” relations with 
Moscow, if the relations are not profitable for its own. Now countries of Central Asia know 
very well how “to improve” their positions in dialog with Russia – via diversification of their 
foreign partners (USA, Turkey, Iran, NATO, China), as Ukraine, Georgia and some other 
countries of CIS did before. Since 2000 new period in relations of Moscow with Central 
Asian countries have begun. It is based on receipts of Realpolitik, tough and to some extent – 
aggressive. The situation in Afghanistan push Russia for the change. 
  
In late 1990s several agreements have been signed, which developed an idea of 
extension of military cooperation in the region, and some of the agreements were not in 
interest of Russia. For instance, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan have signed the 
Treaty on establishment of the single economic area, ensuring peace and stability in the 
region.
140 From the other point of view, Russia have signed several important agreements 
with countries, competing for leadership in Central Asian region (Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan): Declaration of Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on perpetual 
friendship and union, oriented towards XXI century; Joint Statement of Presidents of Russian 
Federation and Republic of Kazakhstan; Joint Statement of Presidents of Russian Federation 
and Uzbekistan. These documents contain articles, which foresee joint actions in spheres of 
defense and security. 
 
In autumn 1996 after a sharp aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan, member-States 
of the Tashkent Treaty from Central Asian region have used mechanism of urgent 
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consultations for coordination with Russia their attitude towards threat to southern borders of 
the CIS. In a very urgent manner the summit of five member-States of the Tashkent Treaty 
have been organized in Almaty. As the result of the Summit the Joint statement was adopted, 
where leaders of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan  and Uzbekistan proclaimed their 
readiness to react in an adequate manner to any threat to their common interests, as well as 
they confirm that they are ready to do all they need to improve security of borders of the 
Tashkent Treaty’s member-States.  
 
The Collective Security Treaty have played an important role in localization of internal 
conflict in Tajikistan. The mechanism of settlement of the long-term conflict, which turned 
Tajikistan  into the Civil War in mid-1990s, consisted of active participation of Russian 
troops in creation of border between the country and external forces, mostly coming from 
Afghanistan.
141 Objectively speaking, such Russia’s policy favored the President of Tajikistan  
Emamali Rakhmonov. But advantages of peaceful life as well as inclusion into management 
of the country representatives of all conflicting sides give us opportunity to speak about 
positive influence of Russia on the situation  in the country. 
 
From our point of view, the strategic purpose of Moscow’s policy in Tajikistan is to 
protect Russia’s southern borders. Already in 1993, in the Treaty on cooperation in military 
sphere between Russia and Tajikistan these two countries have agreed that “Military 
formations of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation are staying during transitional period 
on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan  in places of their permanent dislocation with all 
weapons, munitions, military equipment and other stocks”.
142 
  
The important aspect of crisis in Central Asia is related to production of narcotics – 
opium and heroine. In 1999 about 75% of world production of opium was concentrated in 
Afghanistan, with production about 4 600 metric tones of opium.
143 According to estimations 
of specialists, about 65% of Afghan’s opium cross borders of Central Asian countries to 
Russia and from Russia – to Western Europe and all around the world. One of the purposes 
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for Russian troops on the border on Tajikistan and Afghanistan is to restrain narcotics and 
protect its own territory as well as territory of other countries.  
 
It is rather difficult because borders between countries of Central Asia, as well as 
between them and Russia are existing now only on maps. That’s why it is more profitable for 
Russian Federation from military and economic points of view to protect old Soviet borders 
then establish new borderline on the territory and create all needed facilities, needed to fulfil 
the task of protection of Russian territory. Here interests of Russia and States of Central Asia 
are intersected, that’s why all of them supported Moscow’s idea of establishment of the 
Center of struggle with international terrorism, affiliated to the Federal Security Service of 
Russian Federation. Following this tactic Moscow was able to replace cooperation in purely 
military sphere with countries of region under observation by cooperation in struggle against 
terrorism and organized crime. Probably, the policy will create a better image of the Russian 
Federation in the region and in the CIS in general.  
  
The fact that Russia had changed its military policy in the region of Central Asia, was 
demonstrated by decisions which had been made in summer 2000. Moscow has made 
decision to reorganize the Collective Peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan and start removal the 
troops from Tajikistan. The problem is that the core of collective peace-keeping forces in 
Tajikistan was always consisted of Russian troops.
144 The civil war in the country finished in 
1997 after an agreement between government of Tajikistan and Muslim opposition. The 
process of national reconciliation came to final stage after Presidential elections in Tajikistan 
in 1999. But Russia’s aspiration to keeping its troops in Tajikistan pushed Moscow “to 
change signboard” of troops in the country. Division 201 since 2000 would be deployed in 
Tajikistan as Russian military base. Taking into account threat from Afghanistan and 
problems of spreading of terrorism, this division will be reinforced be Russia’s special 
antiterrorist units – in framework of the Agreement on establishment of joint Antiterrorist 
Center, which was signed by the CIS countries on June 20, 2000.
145 
 
Regular interference of Muslim radicals into political life of Tajikistan is weakening the 
stability of regime of President E. Rakhmonov and that makes this small Central Asian 
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country potentially explosive part of the region. For instance, Kirgizstan have decided in 2000 
to mine passes in mountains and roads at the border with Tajikistan, where terrorists may 
come into neighbor country.
146 
 
Threats to security of the Central Asia are discussing not just in frameworks of the CIS 
or on the bilateral summits, but also on Summits of the Central-Asian Economic Community, 
whose members are Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
147 This organization 
is a typical example of poor countries’ attempt to create a union for attracting attention of 
international community to problems and interests of small States. In practice, the Central-
Asian Economic Community is facing difficult choice to define a key suzerain for the four 
countries under analysis. Objectively speaking, Russia may pretend for the role due to 
historical reasons and proximity of political cultures, created during Soviet period. But 
activities of such countries as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan demonstrate, that 
countries of Central Asia have an opportunity to choose their option of foreign policy strategy 
and Russian variant is not the only one. Arguments of Moscow are still the most powerful, but 
beside political motifs, there are also important economic reasons to include economically 
powerful regimes of the Middle East to the list of partners for Central Asian States. In the 
sphere of economic relations and assistance Russia’s arguments are getting weaker with a 
time-being.  
  
In the beginning of March 2001 the RIA-Novosti Information Agency (Russia) have 
informed about an opportunity to send about 3000 Russian paratroopers to Tajikistan in a near 
future.
148 This information was in line with discussion, started in late 2000 – early 2001 about 
creation of the Central Asian system of regional security and forming of international defense 
coalitions as military pillars of the system. Already in October 2000 member-States of 
reformed Tashkent Treaty have signed two agreements, which are closely related to security 
problems in the South flank of the CIS: “Agreement on status of formation of forces and 
means of the system of Collective security”, and “Agreement on deepening military-political 
integration in frameworks of the Collective Security Treaty and measures oriented on 
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formation regional systems of collective security”. The key striking tool of regional armed 
forces have to be Russian Airborne Forces. As Russian expert noted, “ Russian Airborne 
Forces in near two-three years will lose their peace-keeping functions and will be totally 
concentrated on fulfillment of mobile tasks for guaranteeing security of Russia on its territory 
as well as outside of its territory where the need to protect interests (of Russia – authors) 
exists”.
149 
 
Difficulties of interstate relations in Central Asia have been demonstrated in late April – 
early May 2001 during visits of Presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to Moscow. These 
visits demonstrated rivalry between two very important countries of the region for attention 
and resources of Russia. In the case of President of Tajikistan, the visit was organized in a 
very short period of time, and the only explanation, which observers consider as rational, was 
his  intention to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin before his meeting with the President 
of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov. In fact, rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as 
accusations of Tajikistan by leaders of Uzbekistan in flirting with Muslim opposition and lack 
of political will to prevent activities of the opposition from territory of Tajikistan to Fergana 
valley. That could destroy fragile stability in the territory to the North of Afghanistan. As we 
have mentioned before Moscow for many years was trying to keep equal distance from all 
five countries of the region. But “pragmatization” of Russian foreign policy in Presidency of 
Vladimir Putin led to a need to define countries, which are in a very center of Russian 
diplomacy and military activities in the region. It looks like now there are two lists of the 
most important partners in the region. In terms of economy, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
with their huge oil and gas resources are the most important partners and Moscow is ready to 
devote them more attention then to other three States. But problems of military security didn’t 
loose their importance for Russia, that’s why the second list of Russia’s priorities most 
probably includes Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan keeps its importance for Russia due 
to location on the border with Afghanistan,
150 as well as military base for several thousand 
Russian officers and soldiers, who defend Russian territory on its distant approaches. 
Uzbekistan, contrary, is continuing to be the most important country in Central Asia for 
Russian national interests, whose stability are trying to undermine radical terrorist groups for 
several years since obtaining independence. It is typical for bilateral relations, that in violation 
to all traditions of diplomatic protocol, Russia gave status of the State visit of the President of 
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Uzbekistan to Moscow twice during three years (second “state visit” was in May 2001). 
Tajikistan reacted to this news rather negatively, and evaluated this fact as evidence of 
declining interest of Moscow to Dushanbe. The President E. Rakhmonov once again 
confirmed during his visit in April 2001 to Moscow: «We have never been disappointed, and, 
I hope, that will never be disappointed in our strategic relations of partnership and cooperation 
with Russia in any sphere, oriented into the XXI century”.
151 
 
Kazakhstan as the biggest country in the region with significant Russian-speaking 
population and all types of mineral resources in its land has special significance for Moscow. 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan was seen by Western States in the early years 
of Kazakhstan’s independence as a potential moderate and even reformer. But after many 
years in power he has grown less tolerant of dissent of pluralism, even as multiple stories of 
high-level corruption multiply in his country, potentially very  rich of oil, gas and a lot of 
other mineral resources.
152 
 
In late 1990s Russia and Kazakhstan became leaders in scale of bilateral military 
cooperation among CIS countries. As the minister of defense of Kazakhstan Mukhtar 
Altynbayev noted, “…the two states have concluded more than 60 bilateral interstate, 
intergovernmental and interdepartmental treaties and agreements”.
153 Probably, the most 
important from all bilateral agreements was the Treaty on Military Cooperation, signed by 
presidents of two countries on March 28, 1994 and ratified later by the two countries’ 
legislatures. Significant setback for military cooperation of two countries was Russia’s 
decision to introduce new rules for export/import operations, in accordance with which 
armaments and military equipment must be exported and military-technical services extended 
via intermediary State organizations. It made products more expensive. But at the same time 
Russian military academies and military schools were open for Kazakh servicemen (about 
1100 Kazakh military had their studies there). 
 
Kazakhstan took very cautious position on conflict in and around Afghanistan: 
neutrality and non-interference into internal affairs of the Kabul regime. Such cautious 
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position can be only partly explained by significant distance between two countries. More 
probably, that another factors are playing crucial role here. First of all – absence of legitimacy 
of the President Nazarbaev due to prosecution of political opposition and disputable manner 
of organization of the presidential elections in Kazakhstan. Secondly, giant natural treasures 
of Kazakhstan, which attract attention of practically all biggest States and the most important 
transnational corporation of the world to its national economy. Astana (the capital of 
Kazakhstan) have taken into account interests of at least three the most influential countries in 
the region – Russia, China and the United States. But their interests are very different! The 
United States have economic interests due to activities of their oil companies, but at the same 
time high democratic standards in US foreign policy force American diplomacy pay a lot of 
attention to securing democracy in Kazakh’s political life and, especially, during 
parliamentary and presidential elections in the country. Russia pays significantly less attention 
to issues of democracy and fair elections in bilateral relations with Kazakhstan, but there is 
another problem, which at least potentially may damage relations with Astana – multimillion 
Russian-speaking population. Civil rights of Russians in Kazakhstan are quite frequently 
violated by Kazakh’s authorities. As a result, migration from Kazakhstan to Russia continuing 
to be very sensitive issue and this country is one of the main suppliers of immigrants into 
Russian Federation. For Moscow migration is a rather difficult economic and political 
problem, but Russia’s interests in keeping “temperature” in bilateral relations are so high, that 
Moscow is ready to close eyes on this and many other problems. The United States and 
NATO countries are simply not able to do the same. 
 
The fact, that Uzbekistan, as a country with the biggest population in the region and 
strategic location in the very center of Central Asia, plays the key role in Central Asia’s 
security, respected by all major countries in the world.
154 But the aggravation of tension in the 
country and on its borders led to reconsideration of Tashkent’s attitude to the Collective 
Security Treaty of 1992.
155  President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan began to develop 
mechanisms of solving sharp security problems of his country via activities outside of the 
Collective Security Treaty. Special role in above mentioned attempts of Uzbekistan plays 
“Declaration on strengthening cooperation between Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan”. 
According to comment of the President I.Karimov at the ceremony of signing of the 
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Declaration “…aim of Russia is to create on Southern borders of the CIS a sort of Union or 
block of states, which, being under control of Russia …will be countervailing dangerous 
developments”.
156 The signing of the Declaration was followed by deterioration of relations 
Dushanbe and Tashkent, that’s why quite soon the Declaration disintegrated into two treaties 
of Russia with its partners, as well as a sort of a “Cold War” between two Central Asian 
nations. 
After leaving the Collective Security Treaty in April 1999, Uzbekistan, probably, have 
hoped to increase political and technical assistance from the NATO countries in its resistance 
from threat of Afghanistan. But before his country have left the Tashkent Treaty, Islam 
Karimov have made rather skeptical comment on double standards. After leaving the 
Collective Security Treaty de jure in April 1999, Uzbekistan, probably, had hopes for radical 
increase of assistance from NATO countries in its opposition to the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that before his country had already left the Treaty, the 
President Karimov very skeptically reacted on what he called “double standards” of NATO 
and the EU to post-Soviet countries: “Representatives of NATO and EU recently have 
formulated their position as such: in Kosovo the Yugoslav authorities humiliated human 
rights and avoid fulfillment of the UN decisions , that’s why we have right to strike. But why 
in Afghanistan where war is continuing for 20 years and there is not just humiliation of 
human rights, but a full-scale slaughter of people, total genocide of all national minorities, 
they (NATO and EU – authors) don’t pay even half of their attention compared to Kosovo. 
There is not just catastrophe in Afghanistan, but source of what is an object of energetic fight 
for the whole civilized world: narcotics, terrorism, illegal trade of weapons.
157 
 
However, if the aspiration for NATO assistance have ever existed in Tashkent, it didn’t 
become reality. Instead of political support and military assistance, the NATO countries 
began to criticize the regime of Islam Karimov as authoritarian and non-democratic. As a 
result, according to comment of a Russian journalists: “Islam Karimov have to go cap in hand 
to Moscow”.
158 It resulted in creation of practically full-scale defense alliance of Russia and 
Uzbekistan, oriented on protection of Uzbekistan from threat of Afghanistan, as well 
territorial integrity of Uzbekistan in a situation when there are no officially respected borders 
between countries of Central  Asia.  
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But cooperation of Moscow and Tashkent in the military sphere was very modest in 
1999-2000, and Tashkent selected new policy towards Afghanistan – very limited dialog with 
Taliban leaders and simultaneously – rapid development of its army for growing threat. The 
policy of Tashkent in 2000 was a great failure for Moscow – instead of bilateral military 
union with the country, Russia have got a partner in a very dangerous region, which was very 
skeptical to ability of Russia to be effective and a loyal partner. For instance, Moscow, 
keeping several thousands soldiers in Tajikistan never tried to prevent cooperation between 
leaders in Dushanbe and radical Muslim opposition, which has clear anti-Uzbek essence. For 
many months Moscow was not able to ratify the Treaty on further deepening of cooperation in 
military and military-technical spheres, which was signed on December 11, 1999 by Vladimir 
Putin and Islam Karimov in Tashkent.
159 It took about eighteen months for this ratification 
instead of few weeks! 
 
Ruling elite in Tashkent during 1990s was trying to create image of stable and 
prosperous country for Uzbekistan. There is a significant economic growth in the country 
since 1996 as well as inflow of foreign direct investments. Average growth of the economy is 
about 4,5 5 per year, budget deficit – 2% of GDP, monthly inflation is practically equal to 
inflation in Russia – 1,9.
160 Step by step Uzbekistan is transforming from agrarian country 
into a modern State with industry, oriented to demand of internal market as well as to export 
(Russia is one of the main destinations of Uzbekistan’s export). The policy of keeping 
distance from conflict in Afghanistan was very successive in 2000: industrial production 
jumped to fantastic for post-Soviet countries annual 30% growth in 2000. 
 
Results of the State visit of the President Islam Karimov to Moscow in May 2001, 
according to Russian and international media, were unclear. But journalists found out that 
military-technical cooperation of the two countries was at the top of agenda of the summit. As 
the President Karimov noted in his interview: “We, in Uzbekistan, see strategic partnership 
with Russia as cornerstone for strengthening security in the whole region, where situation is 
not simple due to invasions of terrorist groups into the territories of Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, and 
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Uzbekistan”.
161 He also stated that activity of Russian Federation, oriented on providing better 
security in the region of Central Asia, is totally supported by Uzbekistan.
162 
 
Turkmenistan occupies a special place in the discussion on security co-operation in the 
post-Soviet area.  A quick view does not show any puzzles in the foreign policy of this 
country.  The President of the country Saparmurat Niyazov, who has ruled the country for 
already ten years, announced neutrality already in early 1990s, and based his foreign policy 
on friendly relationship to all its neighbours
163.  According to a Russian expert, 
"Turkmenistan avoids participating in the activities of the CIS, targeted on fight against 
terrorism"
164.  Moscow regards the regime of Taliban as the main foreign partner of the 
terrorists in Chechnya, against which Russia is continuing a military operation.  Turkmenistan 
has introduced visa regime with all the CIS member States, but at the same time it allowed 
double citizenship with Russia.  Moscow reacted negatively to such a policy.  Besides the fact 
that both Russia and Turkmenistan agreed on the strategic character of the bilateral relations, 
in practice the amount of ties between the two countries declined continuously; by 1997 their 
economic co-operation slowed down to zero level.  A sensitive shift to the relationship was 
given in late 1999, when "Gazprom" eliminated the blockade against natural gas from 
Turkmenistan and allowed it into the Russian pipe system.  Moscow unofficially supported 
the agreement between Turkmenistan and the Ukraine, according to which Turkmenistan 
occupied a part of the Ukrainian natural gas market, which earlier had belonged to Russian 
companies in full.  It could be a coincidence, but according to the international organisations' 
data, the growth rate of Turkmenistan's economy in 2000 was a record among post-Soviet 
countries of about 17,6 per cent of GDP
165. 
 
Russian leading media estimates the visit of NATO Secretary General Robertson to 
Turkmenistan in January, 2001 as bringing no advances to the Alliance
166.  NATO's highest 
representative made certain the reluctance of Turkmenistan to be bound with any new 
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international obligations.  As the Kommersant-Daily put it: "Mister Sardjaev (Minister of 
Defense – authors) rejected Western "technical aid for establishing a more beneficial 
cooperation", claiming that "Turkmenistan's got everything it needs"
167.  At the moment 
Turkmenistan is a member of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for 
Peace.  However, it takes part exclusively in those PfP activities, which do not involve regular 
troops. 
Probably, Kirgizstan is the less significant country in the region from economic point of 
view. This country and its President Askar Akaev for a long period of time were “good boys” 
for Western countries. That’s why Kirgizstan for several years was receiving economic 
assistance, support for membership in the WTO as well as political support of the highest 
political level. But quite soon it became clear for Western leaders that Kirgizstan is an 
ordinary Eastern country with ruling despot, whose characteristics are less rough, compared, 
for example, with Turkmenistan, but anyway – too far from rules and norms of a democratic 
State. For Askar Akaev, the main threat to his country is related to activities of radical Islamic 
groups, trying to establish a Muslim state in Fergana valley.
168 Another serious threat to the 
country is continuing conflict with Uzbekistan. When danger from the Islam Movement of 
Uzbekistan forced Tashkent to take energetic military measures for defense of its territory, 
Uzbekistan have decided to lay territorial claims to Kirgizstan At least, diplomats and 
observers in Russia interpreted in this way the wish of Tashkent to establish control over 
some territories on the border of the two countries before legal delimitation of the border. In 
January 2001 Uzbekistan undertook radical measures of economic pressure over Kirgizstan – 
Tashkent cut all supply of natural gas to the neighboring country. Uzbekistan have tied up 
continuation of the natural gas supply to Kirgizstan, on which market it is in practice a 
monopolist, with concessions of territories as a result of negotiations on delimitation of never 
existed as reality border of two countries.
169 
 
The year 2000 became the threshold for Russian policy in Central Asia, first of all in 
reestablishment and further development of military strategic co-operation of Moscow with 
Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.
170  It is too early to speak about results of 
the process. Probably, in future the growing cooperation of Russia and Central Asian 
countries will create more formal relations, a type of strategic cooperation, oriented on 
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protection of the region from Taliban’s Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is supporting current 
regime in Kabul. As The Economist noted: “In Central Asia, the Kremlin has in the past year 
successfully re-established its geo-political clout by playing on fears of Islamic 
insurgency”.
171 
 
From the other side, analysis of all forms of Russia’s policy in the region doesn’t give 
as an opportunity to speak about well-developed and understandable policy of Moscow 
towards the region.
 172 Up to now Russia was able only react on some problems of the region, 
and at the same time – to develop infrastructure for its interference into affairs of Central Asia 
in future. But already now Russia’s interests are interconnecting in Central Asia with such 
powerful countries as the United States, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The United States 
are playing the most significant role in the region, partly`- according to our interviews and 
media reports – via contacts with Pakistan. The new important factor for Russian foreign 
policy in the region is the new generation of political leaders without the “Soviet past” and 
oriented towards Western countries, where they were educated. 
  
If the United States participation in Central Asian politics is very significant, the NATO 
factor in the region is practically non-existent. Countries of Central Asia have signed the 
Partnership for Peace programs, but they didn’t demonstrate any sort of active involvement 
into contacts. For all five countries of the region, participation in the Program is not the 
transitional period on the way into the Alliance, but a symbol of fashion and, at least partly, 
instrument for obtaining advice and assistance from the Alliance. We think that in the near 
future the NATO factor may be totally absent in the international relations in the region. 
Brussels (first of all – European members of NATO) is not so much concerned into playing 
geopolitical games faraway from its borders. The Central Asian countries at the same time 
will move towards more authoritarian regimes, where opposition is under hard pressure 
without legitimate power of leaders and political elite, and the main principle of foreign 
policy is to keep equal distance from major power centers in the region: Beijing, Moscow, 
Islamabad and maybe – Ankara. 
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9.  Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Policy in the CIS 
 
What kind of Russia emerged from the dissolution of the USSR? It has been the subject 
of considerable debate both in Russia and abroad. The key characteristic of Russia in Boris 
Yeltsin’s times was its unpredictability. But NATO eastward enlargement and prospects for 
further enlargement of the EU and NATO, as well as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo have 
compelled Russia to articulate at least some foreign policy preferences. For a Western expert 
from “Stratfor”, Russia under Putin is not only increasingly nationalist at home – as in the war 
in Chechnya – but is pursuing a vastly different foreign policy abroad, one that is forceful and 
decidedly independent of the West”.
173 
 
Transformation of Moscow’s relations with the CIS States (especially with Caucasus 
members of CIS) became outstanding yet when Vladimir Putin was just named as the 
successor of Boris Yeltsin and occupied the office of Prime-Minister of Russia. Usually very 
delicate in commenting CIS affairs, Igor Ivanov made following statement about Caucasus 
country and their policy: “They should be more determined to fight against terrorism. If we 
have information, that terrorists and weapons are penetrating through territory of Azerbaijan 
and Georgia – they have to cooperate with us. It is our common cause”
174 
 
Definition by Russia of its new “Putin’s” foreign policy began from the change of 
attitude to CIS countries and NATO. In fact, first that Vladimir Putin undertook after 
inauguration in May 2000 was abolition of the Ministry on CIS Affairs.
175 The history of the 
Ministry was very complex and difficult – it was established, merged with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, closed and established again several times. We think that after August 1998 
financial crisis and crush of illusion that Russian economy could be the locomotive for 
economic revival of CIS, the very existence of the Ministry have lost rational sense. Rapid 
economic development of Russia in 1999-2001 have led to careful renewal of hopes for 
reintegration, but not exclusively in CIS frameworks. Another very important new factor is 
the more active use of economic tools and even pressure in diplomatic relations of Moscow 
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with the CIS countries. Advanced in February 2001 by former Secretary of Security Council 
of Russia slogan, that full-scale integration has no perspectives in the CIS, sent very clear 
signal to leaders of former USSR Republics – Moscow starts construction of its CIS policy on 
bilateral basis promoting national interests and will oppose to creation inside CIS area anti-
Russian coalition of a GUUAM-type. The message from Moscow is following: if you (CIS 
members) are asking for cooperation with Russia in such spheres as opening markets to goods 
and services, supply of energy resources and access to Russian transport infrastructure – 
“don’t call us – we call you”. The first call of this type from Russian side was about approval 
of the Program of antiterrorist measures 
176 
 
According to the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's statement in spring 2000, the 
new Russian foreign policy doctrine does not impose the will of partners on the sample of 
integration within the CIS.  Therefore, economic motivation of the integration on the post-
Soviet space left the floor to the needs of security, at least for Moscow.   On May 19, 2000 
Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Avdeev, stated that opposition to the 
second wave of NATO enlargement is one of the priorities of the Russian foreign policy
177.  
The Russian Foreign Ministry divides post-Soviet states into three groups according to their 
readiness to join NATO: (1) the Baltic countries, which have already announced their desire 
to join the Alliance, (2) the Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, which do not mention NATO in 
their security concepts but have recently increased the amount of contacts with the Alliance, 
(3) and the states of Central Asia, Armenia and Moldavia, which preserve neutrality.  Avdeev 
also mentioned that the CIS member States themselves have rejected the idea of NATO as the 
only factor of stability in the region; he characterized principles of the Russian foreign policy 
as opposition to building a NATO-centric security model in Europe and preservation of the 
OSCE as the basis of security in Europe.  One must mention that those statement by the 
Russian Foreign Ministry have never been denied or reviewed later and continue being topical 
and urgent. 
In March 23 – April 3, 2000 the joint military exercises of the Collective Security 
Treaty member States and Uzbekistan, represented by the 201
st division in Tajikistan, again 
showed the domination of the anti-terrorist dimension in the Russian security policy.   
Participation of Belarus and Armenia in the exercises has become the first practical step to 
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fulfill the Collective Security Treaty, which allows gathering joint military forces of its 
member States in any part of the Commonwealth
178. 
 
The visit of Vladimir Putin to Kazakhstan in October 2000 has become another step 
towards increasing of Russia's influence in the CIS.  The Treaty on Eurasian Economic Space 
signed there unites the five member States of the CIS Customs Union and allows to develop 
the economic cooperation within the Commonwealth to a new level
179.  There Collective 
Security Treaty member States adopted also very important decisions at the meeting of the 
Collective Security.  Among them one must mention the action plan to build up the collective 
security system within the CIS for the years 2001 – 2005, the Agreement on the status of 
troops of the collective security system and the Agreement on the development of the political 
and military integration in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty and on the 
measures to establish regional collective security systems
180.  Those documents defined the 
procedure, the functions and the tasks of the joint troops of the Collective Security Treaty 
member States  - a new step in the military cooperation between the CIS member States.  
Uzbekistan, which used to view the Collective Security Treaty skeptically, sent its delegation 
with the status of observer to that summit. 
 
The Summit of the member-States of the Collective Security Treaty (October 11, 2000 
in Bishkek) marked a very important borderline in formulation of Russia’s defense policy in 
the CIS area. The new “era of pragmatism” in Russian foreign policy, which associated with 
Vladimir Putin, manifested itself in successful attempt of Moscow to force other members of 
the Treaty to sign the Agreement on status of forces and means of the system of collective 
security. The Agreement created favorable legal base for transportation of troops and military 
technologies between the Tashkent Treaty member States. Besides of that, Russia have 
guaranteed access to its markets of ammunition and military technologies for the Treaty’s 
members, where prices are significantly lower compared to the price level of the world market 
of weapons.
181 Results of joint military training operations (“Southern Shield of 
Commonwealth 2000” and several others) were analyzed in Bishkek and the decision have 
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been made to establish the Collective Forces of the Collective Security Treaty. The central 
part of the Forces will consist of military formations, which took part in above mentioned 
exercises. In practice, Bishkek Agreements marked an attempt to create on significant part of 
post-Soviet territory a sort of hybrid of a military alliance of NATO-type and “Blue Helmets” 
of the United Nations. It should be mentioned that one day before (October 10, 2000) a 
decision has been made to transform the Custom Union of five CIS members into the Euro-
Asian Economic Community – a copy of the European Economic Community of pre-
Maastricht years.
182 
 
New agenda for co-operation in frameworks of the Tashkent Treaty have been 
demonstrated during Moscow meeting of defense ministers of its member-States (December 
21, 2000). It was the fourth meeting of the ministers in 2000 and had extraordinary 
character.
183 Officially, the theme of the meeting was related to discussion on further military 
cooperation for period 2001-2005. But in practice, the central part of the discussion was 
formulated as “a Struggle against international terrorism”.
184 The Treaty member-States and 
other CIS countries elaborated quite traditional program of contacts, but more important – 
defense ministers and leaders of the CIS countries have decided to establish the Antiterrorist 
Center for exchange of information and coordinate joint operations and activities. Ministers of 
defense from Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan didn’t take part in Moscow meeting. 
Probably, it was one of the reason why issues of struggle against terrorism occupied 
significant part of bilateral contacts of Russian Ministry of Defense in bilateral contacts with 
the countries (especially, with Uzbekistan and Moldova) in 2001.  
 
In fact, during 2000-2001 Vladimir Putin let know both CIS countries and major 
Western states, that Russia is not a hostage of the CIS anymore. Other CIS members have at 
least equal interest to securing normal relations with Moscow. Very often these countries 
prefer format of bilateral cooperation, and in perspective combination of the bilateral contacts 
may lead to multilevel cooperation in economic field, as well as even in the field of security. 
If Russian economy stop its fast development, probability of the scenario is getting smaller. 
But if the economic boom of 2000-2001 with its record level of industry’s growth and 
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positive trade balance will continue in coming several years, implementation of the scenario 
doesn’t look totally unreal. 
 
Former Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Sergey Ivanov, during his speech in 
Munich (February 4, 2001) at the 37
th International Conference on Security Issues repeated 
once more that Russia keep its negative stand towards NATO eastward enlargement.
185 For 
him, NATO intentions to secure and even reinforce Alliance’s structure can hardly be 
explained in nowadays circumstances, when Russia started reform of its military forces not 
just in the Ministry of Defense, but in other “power ministries” as well. In particular, total 
number of troops in “power ministries” will be reduced by 568 000, including 440 000 
officers and soldiers of the Ministry of Defense. Sergey Ivanov put NATO activities under a 
severe criticism. According to his address to participants of the Conference, the Kosovo crisis 
demonstrated “inability of NATO to manage effectively peacekeeping tasks”. The NATO 
attempt to try itself in the role of peacekeeping operation, according to the same address of 
S.Ivanov, “led to escalation of the Kosovo conflict to scale of humanitarian catastrophe, 
bigger in size then the Chernobyl disaster.”
186 So, the continuity of Yeltsin’s foreign policy to 
NATO was demonstrated very clearly, and the message was sent – NATO enlargement will 
lead to Russian reaction in a sphere, where Russia’s positions continuing to be quite strong. 
  
We think that there are two variants of Russia’s reaction on NATO enlargement, which 
are in line with policy of Vladimir Putin. In the case of enlargement towards Central Europe 
and Balkans (Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) Russia will criticize the 
move but avoid any concrete steps for deterioration of its relations with NATO. But if NATO 
enlarge to the Baltic States or any other post-Soviet State, then diapason or measures available 
for Moscow in every concrete situation would be individual. But in any scenario we will face 
with new and more deep crisis in Moscow-Brussels relations compared to situation of the 
Kosovo conflict. For Moscow it will be rather difficult in this case to distinguish between 
(bad) relations with Brussels and (constructive) policy towards major NATO countries. We 
should still remember short and eloquent note of Vladimir Putin in Vienna in February 2001: 
“Well, they (NATO countries – authors) don’t accept us in NATO”. Probably, it means that 
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Russia has already decided that relations with NATO are rather important and “temperature” 
in the relations should not be very cold. Moscow needs permanent connection with NATO 
Head-Quarters and dialog on the basic issues of European politics. But at the same time, the 
relations should not be very close, that’s why Kremlin isn’t react positively on statements of 
NATO representatives about importance of such institution of cooperation as the Permanent 
Joint Council.
187 
 
We consider that Russia in the near future will pay small attention to relations with 
NATO. “Super task” of Russian foreign policy in 1990s consisted of rising of OSCE status up 
to getting monopolistic control over security in European continent. The task was not 
correlated with realities and, as a result, was not fulfilled. But Moscow didn’t give up the 
idea. In situation when Moscow is not considering as a threat to Europe, and at the same time 
Europe is not a threat to Russia, there is no need in maintenance of broad and intensive 
cooperation with NATO. Good relations with NATO may be at any moment sacrificed for an 
effective propagandistic measure against enlargement of the Alliance. As Russian journalist 
D.Kosyrev noted about activity of Igor Ivanov as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
“Essence of Igor Ivanov’s policy can be characterized in a following way: to behave as a great 
power waiting for a moment, when Russia really will be a great power”
188 We may say the 
same about political course of the President Vladimir Putin. 
 
International Conference on security Issues in Munich (February 2001) was 
commemorated by another several statements of Sergey Ivanov, which are important for our 
report. His statements were related to Russia-CIS cooperation and perspectives for changes of 
Russian foreign policy in post-Soviet area. Talking about totally “new approach” towards 
CIS, Sergey Ivanov said, for example: “...rapid transformation of the Commonwealth (of 
Independent States – authors) is not possible in a near future”.
189 He immediately gave 
economic reasons for the new strategy of skepticism towards CIS. According to Russia’s 
estimations, total debts of CIS countries to Russia are about $5,5 billion ($8 billion according 
to another source).
190 Russia is considering the debts as its economic assistance to the newly 
independent states. But Moscow is waiting for some concessions from CIS countries in 
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response.
191 In reality, however, there are no “special” relations with CIS members from 
Kremlin’s point of view (with the only exception of Belarus). In this situation Russia under 
Presidency of Vladimir Putin is not going to continue the policy of economic assistance and 
concessions, when Moscow regularly is getting in response only rhetoric about faithfulness to 
the idea of integration, but never – concrete actions for the integration. This point of view 
may be seen as pragmatic and economically rational for Russia. But in reality practical 
outcomes of the new course for Russia could be much less favorable compared to currently 
existing policy of moderate intervention into affairs of the CIS countries. The most probably, 
the new policy is based on ideas, formulated in the Center of Strategic Studies (known as the 
Gref Center in Russia). One of the Center’s believes is that there is necessity for Russia to 
turn in relations with former Soviet Republics to norms, recommended by the WTO. It means 
that Russia has to play in the most important sphere of its foreign policy (foreign economic  
relation) according to rules, which are unknown in Russia, or are known mainly from 
theoretical point of view.  
 
Another priority of new Russian foreign policy – priority of bilateral relations with CIS 
countries to the detriment of multilateral contacts. Indeed, the only possible leader and 
sponsor of cooperation and integration in the post-Soviet area is Russian Federation (if it is a 
member of an integration-oriented organization). But now economic situation in Russia itself 
is so difficult that Moscow is spending all resources for getting control over situation in its 
own country. It is not time for economic philanthropy from the side of Russia. It means that 
Moscow is not in power to use the most effective tool of influencing partners and obtaining 
friends at the international arena – via regular and frequently symbolic economic assistance to 
poorer countries. In addition to that, Moscow is loosing very effective instrument of influence 
in form of international organization under its leadership. It is hardly a rational and pragmatic 
policy for new leaders in Kremlin. Indeed, after possible dissolution of the Collective Security 
Treaty, the period of open and unlimited competition over dominance in the post-Soviet area 
starts. As we have mentioned above, from our point of view Russia possess good position in 
the competition in the long run. But at the moment more important that Russia are loosing 
good starting position for the competition. As one Russian expert noted recently, analyzing 
new foreign policy of Vladimir Putin: “Today pragmatism means revision, while not just in a 
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sense of denial of former priorities and reorientation towards new ones, but in a sense of 
inventorying all results of post-Soviet, Soviet, and even Imperial periods of foreign policy of 
Russia. The task is arrogant and there are some doubts that Putin and his team would be able 
to manage with the task”.
192  
 
There is the phantom of GUUAM over all Russian politics in the CIS area. Indeed, the 
perspective to face with powerful and firm “cordon sanitaire” on its Southern borders is 
hardly wonderful for Russian diplomats and military. Russian scholars are talking about 
GUUAM as a threat more and more loudly.
193 But it looks like the perspective is not 
attractive for Western countries as well. As one of Western experts told authors in interview, 
officials from military and political structures of NATO are trying to avoid discussion on 
establishment of direct contacts with GUUAM and recognition of GUUAM as a partner in 
cooperation in the field of security. GUUAM, for Russian Federation, is an economic 
organization, where key player is not Kiev, but Baku.
194 But there is more and more 
information coming from Azerbaijan, that oil reserves in the country are not as big as leaders 
in Baku were trying to convince. Since Moscow in late 2000 and early 2001 was able to 
change general course of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy for less confrontational to Moscow, “the 
phantom of GUUAM” is disappearing from political landscape of CIS. Summit of GUUAM, 
organized after several failed attempts in Yalta in June 2001, demonstrated the artificial 
character of the organization in current situation. It looks like the main topic of discussion at 
the Summit was about Russia’ attitude to GUUAM and the main idea – that GUUAM in not 
an anti-Russian organization. Few results of the Summit bring us to conclusion that the 
organization will exist (i.e. there will be conferences, meetings and even Summits) up to the 
moment when the United States stop financing of the organization. But without positive 
reaction of Moscow the organization may be transformed in a very near future into GUA 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan) or even disappear totally. It is very clear now that Russia is 
not going to join GUUAM for fulfilling objectives of the organization, pronounced in Yalta. 
That’s why the shortest way to create transport infrastructure as well as establish free trade 
area is via GUUAM joining Euro-Asian Economic Community. Of course, under the political 
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and economic leadership of Russia. The reason is quite simple – there is no European security 
and well-functioning economy without democratic Russia. The German Minister of Defense 
Rudolf Sharping emphasized the idea in a very open way in early 2001: “For solving global, 
as well as European problems, we need Russia”.
195 
 
NATO factor in 1990s have experienced sharp upward flight, whose pick was during 
second Presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996-1999). Now we may see another stage of its 
dynamic – reduction of NATO influence in the CIS. It may be explained not just by active 
opposition of Russian Federation during just started Presidency of Vladimir Putin, but 
unwillingness (or inability) of NATO to play more active role in the post-Soviet area in 
accordance with interests, which can unite whole Europe. Security of the European continent 
is not possible to divide between NATO members and non-members. Up to the moment when 
NATO (OSCE, etc.) will unite the whole Europe in a single security organization, we witness 
competition between two power centers, where traditional for Realpolitik zones of influence 
exists and competition continuing to be intensive.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
The relationship between Russia and the West on the edge of centuries have developed 
to the point when any scenario of their development has become possible: from full-scale co-
operation to entire split in security sphere. The ability to decide rationally has narrowed, so 
has the dependence of decisions in foreign affairs on economic realities. After the financial 
crisis in Russia in August 1998 the West has approximately cancelled all its aid and credit 
programs to Russia; in response, Moscow's decision-makers finished considering their 
Western colleagues more experienced. The issue of interdependence split in the current 
Russian-Western relations in two parts. The West remains the main supplier of hard currency 
and know-how to Russia. The latter remains an important supplier of fuel to Europe; its 
exports, which does not depend on OPEC's decisions, allows to limit the growth of the world 
price on oil. Both parties remain very important to each other. However, one should not 
exaggerate the mutual interest, the interdependence of Russia and the West is very weak. The 
West is able to solve its energetic problems without Russia; the share of Russia in the external 
trade of the West is very small. Formally, Russia is very interested in preserving the access of 
its goods to Western markets. At the same time the West would hardly build barriers against 
Russian export of oil, gas and other mineral resources. What concerns Russian production and 
services, the Western markets are almost closed for such imports. The current stage of the 
Russian-Western economic relations should be viewed as a very unimportant one, which 
shows the crisis of trust and co-operation on both sides. Nowadays, when the US focuses on 
internal economic affairs and the process of European integration and the EU reform remains 
difficult, Russia and the West do not pay much attention to each other, therefore, the scenario 
of confrontation appears easier than the long seek for respect of mutual interests. 
 
It would be wrong to research Russian interests as limited only with Russian territory. 
It would be also unrealistic to view the rest of the world as the zone of the United States and 
NATO interests. The true lies somewhere in between those marginal points, however, it is still 
unclear, whether Russian and Western politicians appear to be able to find that solution. The 
situation will be first tested in 2002, when it is clear, whether the Baltic States entered the 
NATO or not. There will be more tests for the relations to be passed.   
The fortune of the Tashkent Treaty reflects the common tendency of the CIS 
development: very important and often very radical laws get adopted, but never get ratified by   86 
national parliaments and supported by national governments. Even if is does take place, those 
laws never get fulfilled. 
 
By the end of 1997, when the development of the CIS faced its most difficult crisis, 
CIS member States signed only 130 papers of the 886, adopted by the Council of Heads of 
States or by the Council of Heads of Governments; only five of the papers came in force in all 
the countries.
196 Generally speaking, Russia sought stability on all frontiers. Superpower that 
it was, the Soviet Union had a political handful with its small-power periphery. Today the 
bounds of the periphery have changed but Russia’s nearest neighbors are still a handful to 
handle. 
 
The Vladimir Putin's visit aimed on the moderation of the disintegrative processes 
inside the CIS. It looks like he plans to achieve the aim in an unusual way via accelerated 
deconstruction of "dead" institutions and concentrating attention on the perspective ones. 
Among the latter there are bilateral military cooperation of Russia with other CIS countries, 
several multilateral initiatives in the military sphere (common anti-missile defense) and 
production of arms. 
 
The factor of personality of Vladimir Putin in the post-Soviet area needs more 
attention of researchers. However, even now one may say that he is a better person to 
strengthen links in the post-Soviet area that Boris Yeltsin has ever been. Besides his evident 
ability to visit any CIS member State in case of emergency or in accordance to the protocol, 
Vladimir Putin, already during first months of his presidency, did what Yeltsin has never been 
able to do: he articulated the main aims of Russian policy in the post-Soviet area. Geydar 
Aliev, the President of Azerbaijan and one of the most affective politicians in the area, 
underlined that in June 2000, claiming that "after the change of leadership in Russia the CIS 
has started the second stage in its life".
197 
 
Nowadays the Tashkent Treaty implements the principles of multi-level and multi-
speed integration. Cooperation in the security sphere among significant CIS member States 
and their small groups is developing. However, such multi-level and multi-speed development 
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shows a deep crisis of the idea of military cooperation of the CIS member States, especially in 
the sectors of collective security inside the CIS and common priorities of the defense policies 
of its member States. None of the member States sees collective security as an urgent matter, 
especially in the conditions of the economic crisis, of which all CIS countries suffer currently. 
The majority of the countries possess their main threats inside the State borders. They are 
separatist movements, ethnic conflicts, corruption, organized crime, etc. The solution of those 
problems requires not only military measures, but also social and economic reforms, 
democratization of the political life, ensuring of democratic freedoms. The solution of those 
problems also requires bilateral cooperation with Russia and closest neighbor countries. In 
such a situation the relationship between the CIS member States and NATO look like efforts 
of couturiers: one can produce and show such clothes, but one can not wear it. 
 
Moscow policies towards NATO in 2000-2001 have demonstrated that it considers 
freezing of relations with the Alliance, which took place in 1999, as a failure. Automatic 
counter-action against NATO's move of any kind is being gradually replaced with the other 
policy model: seeking of areas where Moscow and Brussels could co-operate, understanding 
that "common danger overweighs current contradictions"
198. The appointment by the new US 
Administration of Alexander Vershbow as an Ambassador in Moscow is characteristic in that 
context. This appointment is traditionally considered to be the “…one of the most important 
political decisions made at the outset of a new administration”.
199 Government-oriented mass-
media in Russia did not interpret it as a sign of decline in Russia-USA relations, though in 
time of Kosovo conflict Vershbow was the one among mostly criticized NATO leaders.  
 
The crisis in Chechnya, around Afghanistan and other hot spots on CIS territory 
showed, that NATO did not plan direct interference into conflict settlement there. NATO 
member-States possess large potential for organizing diplomatic dialogue, they can give 
considerable economic assistance on bilateral basis and also through international financial 
institutions as mediators. However, NATO countries always link such help to certain 
provisions. Some of them are unacceptable for CIS member-States, especially while it applies 
to the liberalization of their respective political regimes. Currently Russia appears as a 
democratic country within CIS territory, even if to take into account loud campaign around 
"Gusinski affair" and the discussion of danger of the free press in Russia, which it implied. In 
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other CIS countries situation with democratic freedoms seems to be even more dramatic: total 
eradication of opposition (Turkmenistan), opposition is imprisoned (Georgia, Kirgizstan), or 
in exile (Belarus). The free press is jeopardized in practically all CIS countries because of 
direct government actions manifested in press censure or use of administrative means for 
influencing electronic media or newspapers. CIS member-States have not become the part of 
Western world and that's why an idea of position equidistant from Russia and NATO seems to 
be more and more attractive to them, for it enables conscious bargaining with both sides. It is 
not at all fortuitous, that in second part of 1990s was signed a number of large-scale bilateral 
agreements examined above. 
 
  NATO is one of the key factors in the post-Soviet area that influences the 
harmonization of the foreign policies of the CIS member States. That factor influenced the 
Collective Security Treaty of 1992. During the negotiations on the treaty the position of the 
CIS member States was very tough, since they felt themselves able to apply for NATO's 
military assistance and aid. Currently it is not enough for Moscow to point at different 
abstract threats in the post-Soviet area, when seeking for the ability to deploy troops on the 
territories of the CIS member States. Now Russia has whether to point at serious threats (such 
as Talibs in Central Asia) or put pressure on its neighbors, taking into consideration that the 
latter may hardly be hidden from the international community. Doing so (especially in 1999 - 
2000), Russia attempted to meet its national interests in the form that its President and its 
Government articulate very clearly. However, Russia's neighbors are disable to recognize 
those interests silently; and that leads to diplomatic conflicts and worsening of the entire 
situation on the post-Soviet area, as well as between Russia and NATO. Another source of 
misunderstanding between Russia and NATO is Vladimir Putin's belief that "NATO has to be 
dismissed. When Moscow represents no threat, it is not necessary to enlarge military 
blocks".
200 
 
A bar for the military cooperation on the post-soviet area exists because of the break 
of the technological links between the ex-USSR Republics and because of the transfer of the 
accounts for the delivery of military production and devices to the currency. In the current 
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situation any step to the recreation of co-operation between the CIS-members attracts great 
attention of the West and especially of NATO
6. 
 
More active and aggressive course of Russia towards the CIS-members in 1999-2001 
has promptly given concrete results. It can be seen first of all in the reinforcement of the 
Russian position in Caucasus. The time when Armenia was hesitating if Moscow or Ankara 
was of more importance for Yerevan has passed by. Georgia has changed the tonality of its 
discussions with Russia to much more pacific one, stopped to mention the membership in  
NATO and declared Russia to be an important participant of the peace process in Caucasus. 
But probably the most impressing results the Putin’s policy has had in Azerbaijan. The many 
years “Cold war” between Moscow and Baku was immediately forgotten and substituted by 
the pragmatic course of the both countries directed to the co-operation in such important 
spheres as the struggle against the terrorism and the economic links between the two 
countries.
7The problem of dislocation on the Azerbaijan’s territory of Gabalin radar 
installation, very important for Russia, is still unsolved but in the nearest future there is no 
risk for this installation. 
 
Evidently, the political forces are already born and strengthened in Russia that will 
oppose in a flat form to the reintegration on the ex-USSR area.
8 Their position can hardly be 
changed even by the idea that the reintegration can diminish the depth of the economic and 
financial crisis in which the Russian economy is involved, because the reinstatement of the 
former economic links can stimulate the Russian economy. 
 
Addressing to the international conference on security in Munich in February 2001 G. 
Robertson made, according to the mass-media information, a statement which was important 
for Russia: “The Transatlantic Community’s mission will be concluded when all the States, 
Russia including, will join the integrated, liberal and prosperous Europe.”
9 From the point of 
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view of a scientist, it can’t be called a cannon for the NATO’s dismissal, because such 
cannons would be elaborated on, and this is a task for politicians and diplomats. Evidently  
both, Russia and NATO, will remain the main figures in the post-soviet area for a long time. 
Their relations in this region may be far from being ideal. And yet taking into account the 
mutual interests, the correlation between the real possibilities of the parts to pursue their 
interests in the region and the practical actions will permit to bring certain stability. 
 
The experts from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs still are trying to resolve the 
problem: ”Is the plurisideness an artificially constructed and that’s why an invented scheme or 
is it the reality of the modern system of the international relations, determined by many 
politicians and specialists in this field as transitional?”
10 In practice Russia has always 
behaved like one of the world’s power centers and will always behave in this way. It is 
necessary for it because this behavior of Moscow  was demanded by its  near by and far away 
neighbors. Only the active policy will permit Russia to keep in future its sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and richest natural resources, possibility to determine by itself the 
favorable situation in the field of security. The United States and NATO may declare as many 
times as they wish that Russia has lost for them its significance and is regarded now as an 
other, a problem, a crisis state.
11 This point of view is not only wrong but it is provocative 
towards Russia. It really means that the other big neighbors of Russia are invited to pursue 
against Moscow a more strict course. Now we see that the changes in the German foreign 
policy are caused by this influence. If Japan, China or the European Union  begin to build 
their relations with Russia on this principles, it will be the beginning of the way to a 
catastrophe. And not only for Russia. 
 
The problem, not yet resolved in Moscow but near to be resolved, is the evaluation of 
the NATO’s possibility to act in the post-soviet area with the same effectiveness as in Europe 
before NATO has passed to the military phase of the Kosovo crisis. To our mind, the last two 
years of the Alliance’s activity and the discussions about it have shown that we can’t expect 
any effectiveness from the NATO in the conflicts in Karabah, Tajikistan or Pridnestrovie. 
Nowadays NATO is a convenient alternative to the post-soviet States that like many centuries 
ago are to decide: with or without Russia. Moscow, it is clear, would prefer the first variant, 
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but while the ruling leaders of  the CIS-members are not  sure of their own legitimacy and 
stability, they believe the balance between Moscow and Brussels to be a guarantee of their  
own security and of the retention of the interest towards themselves. Truly, this policy can’t 
be of long continuation, besides the balance “Russia-NATO” the post-soviet States have many 
other important problems, and neither Brussels nor Moscow are interested in them. Many 
European NATO-members don’t want to wait for the improvement of the American-Russian 
relations. On  the scale of their priorities the interests of the European integration  are  above 
the interests of the NATO. According to Evstafyev, “ only a  blind can’t  see the strategic 
stalemate where the Europeans and first of all Germany have found themselves assuming the 
main financial burden of the European integration. Russia, in the end, at the current level of  
consuming capacity of   the most part of the population can wait for some time… choosing its 
own partners. And Europe can’t: the credit of confidence to the pan-European processes is 
exausted.”
12  Evidently, this difficulties inside the EU wouldn’t bring to extrude Washington  
from Europe. Still they can make the both parts examine more attentively the interests of  
Russia. And  this is the very aim of the Russian authorities! 
 
In the long-termed perspective of  the Russia-NATO relations there may be only two 
options. The first one is now considered the most favorable for Russia, it is the dismissal of  
NATO because of the absence of the reasons for its existence. The second one is also 
unfavorable for the Alliance and includes the admission of Russia as a full member. The 
second scenario can hardly be considered a real one, because such a step  can draw many 
consequences. For example, NATO would assume the responsibility for maintaining the 
peace on the Russia-Chinese frontier 4200 km long. Nowadays more important is the analysis  
of the middle-term outlook on the relations in the post-soviet area. The analysis made 
demonstrates that the role of NATO in the 1990s reinforced gradually, but on the border of 
the centuries – after the Kosovo crisis and the inauguration of the new Russian President- the 
place occupied by NATO in the foreign policy of the CIS-members has begun to dwindle. 
NATO can hardly consider its merit the fact that the new Independent States are making use 
of it in their permanent bargaining with Russia on the energy resources supplies, on the cost 
of the lease of  military bases, on the possibility of access of the local goods to the enormous 
Russian market. 
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The idea of the integrate defensive space and of the common armed forces inherited 
from the USSR was not realized. The cause of it in the great difference of the state interests 
on the international arena, in the competitiveness in the wide sphere of the political and 
economic problems. In the course of time the Tashkent Treaty has become a discussion club 
for those few CIS-members who really believe that it is better to bridge over the military 
dangers against their territory together. Nowadays the main danger of this kind is created by  
terrorism and  Muslim radicalism in Caucasus and in Central Asia. Belarus stays apart. The 
reason for the active collaboration of Minsk with the CIS defensive institutes is the endeavor 
of the Belarusian President to keep his power in spite of constitutional tort and the violation of 
the democratic liberties in his own country. 
From the point of view of the current policy Russia is for the CIS-members a more 
convenient partner then the NATO. It can be explained by the readiness of Russia to close the 
eyes at the violation of the democracy in this countries, that is quiet an ordinary thing in 
nearly all the CIS-members. This means that Russia is less limited in the pursuing its foreign 
politics then the NATO. There is one more important characteristic of the Russian policy: it is 
more ready to play an active role in the repulsing the dangers for the CIS, the internal (the 
activity of the international terrorists in the Central Asia countries) as well as the external (the 
danger for the South frontier of the CIS from the part of Afghanistan). This Russian readiness 
can be embodied in the employment of the armed forces dislocated in the CIS members and in 
the attraction of the new forces. The practice of the last ten years has shown that Russia is 
ready to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers and officers for its own security even if the danger is 
far away from the Russian territory. The NATO member-States are not ready for this and will 
hardly do it in future. 
From the other side, trying to receive the economic aid for the reforming of their 
economy, as well as to guarantee the keeping of the sovereignty and the territory integrity, the 
CIS members place their hopes on the most developed states united in the NATO. This 
international organization, which possess the highest authority in the field of military security, 
may play a equalizing role on the CIS area. In this way the same fact of keeping  the relations 
of the post-soviet States with NATO must not be considered  by Moscow as a action directed 
against its interests. The problem  is far more complicated. Will the NATO be able to act in 
this region with the same effectiveness as the Alliance acted in Europe during the Kosovo 
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crisis ? The answer is not clear. It is not also clear if NATO  has sufficient knowledge about 
the specific character of the region, its political and cultural traditions, decision–making 
process, history. The CIS-members are burdened not only with the anticommunist ideas but 
also by the anti-European and anti-Western spirits inherited from the pre-soviet times and 
forced by the anti-American and anti-NATO propaganda of USSR epoch. 
 
The analysis of  the first steps of the new American Administration, as results from the  
dominating in Russia point of view, shows that Washington wants to give less attention to the 
post-soviet countries then the Clinton’s Administration. As one of the experts  noted recently, 
“Washington seems to have decided to strict its politics towards the post-soviet States. And it 
seems also that its politics towards Russia is of no more importance.’
13 One of the possible 
conclusions that can be done concerning this change of the United States course is that Russia 
has now a chance to become a dominating force in the CIS, because any other State or any 
bloc of States would hardly risk to interfere stratagem of the political and other contradictions 
on the vast  territory of the ex-soviet empire. Though Russia has never declared officially its 
growing interest to the interference into the CIS affairs ( as it is mentioned above, S.Ivanov 
made quite opposite statement), in fact in 2000-2001 we can see the activation of the Moscow 
policy. This is not but the very beginning of the change of the tendency which is now quite 
convertible, but in the course of time it is seen more clearly. The Russian politicians and the 
diplomats are convinced by the experience of the contacts with NATO and the relations with 
the Alliance in the post-soviet area that “ nobody will take you into consideration if you are 
weak. In fact it is of no importance that your weakness is the result of your trying to adapt 
yourself to the new situation in the world and to observe the conventional rules of the game, 
in other words is the result of your attempt to become better.”
14 Now Russia is realizing this 
belief  in practice. 
 
Constructing its relations with the nearest neighbors and with the European States 
Russia takes into a serious account the NATO factor. To our mind Moscow in the last years 
has been actively creating a situation favorable to conclude a “Big Deal” with NATO. It is 
now difficult to draw the scope of such a deal. It is clear it will concern the security in Eurasia 
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and probably the mutual guarantees of the security of the Eurasian States. Russia is interested 
in keeping  the frontiers of the existent States  inviolable, i.e.  is against the further split of the 
region. It is also interested in the recognition of its special influence on the ex-USSR States, 
the Baltic States including. In this way it is possible that this “Big Deal” will concern the 
formalization of the relations between NATO on one side and the States of the Treaty on the 
Collective Security on the other, and also the mutual guarantees of security for the States 
geographically located between these two alliances. Now such a prospective looks like an 
utopia. Nevertheless the goal-seeking behavior of the Russian diplomacy and militaries shows 
that in the nearest time Moscow will begin to speak with the NATO-members on behalf of the 
Treaty on the Collective Security as nowadays it is speaking on behalf of Belarus. 
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